Online Extremist Communities and Mass Killings at Schools and Other Educational Institutions. Part 3.

 

Continued: Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2.

The implementation of additional monitoring measures and both overt and covert interventions targeting adolescents in potential at-risk groups* within educational and childcare institutions. This should have a significant impact on the total number of potential victims of «Death Group» recruiters and, consequently, on the number of perpetrators of crimes committed at the direction of and in the interests of these groups. As a result: a reduction in the activity of such groups, a slowdown in the spread of the extremist ideas they promote, and, most importantly, a decrease in the number of serious and particularly serious crimes committed by their members in countries where this work is actually carried out.

If this approach is integrated into the work of psychologists and sociologists at educational and other children’s institutions on a permanent basis, Maintaining the work of an international monitoring and coordination group - which will track changes in the situation and adjust detection and countermeasures accordingly- will serve as an effective deterrent to the threat and, in the long term, help bring the situation under control.

As an effective complement to the aforementioned deterrence measures- one that reduces the number of potential victims for recruiters - I would suggest that the leadership of schools, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children and adolescents gather consider implementing an approach such as CPTED.

 CPTED: The concept of «Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design» (CPTED) is an approach aimed at reducing crime by altering the physical environment in which it occurs. The core of the concept is that a well-designed physical space can prevent crime, deter undesirable behavior, and strengthen community ties.

 The effectiveness of this method in reducing violence in educational institutions has been confirmed by many years of practical research conducted by Safe Havens International (SHI) - one of the world’s oldest and most experienced expert and analytical organizations specializing in improving safety in educational institutions.

For more details on CPTED implementation methods and the results achieved, see the articles by SHI Executive Director Michael Dorn, a recognized international expert in the field of school safety and security.

Although creating a more comfortable psychological and emotional environment does not solve all security problems and does not have a guaranteed effect on all at-risk adolescents, according to research findings, the use of such methods can reduce anxiety, stress, and aggression among some adolescents by 10–15 percent, thereby reducing the number of potential victims. And the fewer such emotionally and psychologically vulnerable adolescents there are, the more difficult it will be for recruiters from «death groups» to attract and control them.

It’s simple math. Today, «curators» from extremist communities recruit hundreds and thousands of teenagers through their online platforms, but at best, only dozens agree to participate in active operations, and only a handful commit particularly serious crimes. By reducing the initial number, we will reduce the rest as well. Even a 10–15% reduction would be a good result here.

The next aspect of the threat containment phase is blocking the online resources used by criminals. It is important to understand that this aspect is extremely complex, both technically and legally. Blocking must be precise and targeted, focusing on specific communities and individual accounts through which extremist material is disseminated and teenagers are recruited to engage in criminal and terrorist activities.

In this situation, criminals exploit several existing vulnerabilities. I have identified five main problems that we face:

1.    The difficulty of blocking individual accounts on social media and messaging apps.

Using technical and software-based blocking tools, it is practically impossible to restrict access to one (or more) individual accounts without the involvement of the social media or messaging app administration.

2. The complexity and length of the legal and administrative procedures required to obtain court orders to block such websites, as well as individual profiles and communities.

As a follow-up to point 1: The administrators of social media platforms and messaging apps generally recognize the threat, but—in accordance with their internal policies, as well as national and international legal instruments on freedom of speech and information - they require law enforcement agencies to provide evidence and, often, court orders to block accounts. Obtaining such a ruling is not easy, and often takes a long time—sometimes weeks or months - while law enforcement officials gather the evidence needed to present to the court.

3. Jurisdiction.

As I mentioned in Parts 1 and 2, this threat is international in nature. In recent years, extremists have most often used a scheme in which the recruiter is located in one country and his victims in another. In doing so, the perpetrator often chooses countries that have diplomatic disputes and where cooperation between law enforcement agencies is virtually nonexistent. Court rulings in one country carry no weight in another.

4. Procedural Differences.

Different countries have different criminal laws, and different types of crimes have different qualifying characteristics, types (categories), nature, and severity. What is considered a particularly serious crime in one country may be regarded as an administrative offense in another. Under the law of one country, certain types of items, methods of recording, and procedures for seizing information are considered evidence in court, while in another they are not.

5. Differences in procedural documentation.

Different countries have different types, forms, and methods for preparing procedural documents, as well as different methods for recording and documenting evidence, questioning suspects and witnesses, and obtaining and admitting evidence into the case file. Evidence gathered in one country will not be accepted by a court in another country simply because it was not properly documented, due to differing procedural approaches to documenting facts of procedural significance.

All of this complicates the work of law enforcement officers and makes it easier for criminals and criminal organizations to operate. On the other hand, however, it is also unacceptable to simplify the procedure for blocking accounts by reducing the number and quality of the legal grounds for doing so. This would provide grounds both for unfounded and unsubstantiated restrictions on the dissemination of information based solely on suspicion, and for deliberate abuse of power. This cannot be allowed; the rule of law is a fundamental principle and must be strictly observed.

But how, then, can we ensure both prompt action and strict adherence to the rule of law? Is such a compromise even possible? Yes, it is possible, but it will require fundamental changes to the current approach.

Currently, sending an international request (even between countries that have agreements in place) takes weeks or months; during that time, hundreds, if not thousands, of teenagers could be drawn into criminal networks, and dozens of serious crimes could be committed. We need a system for rapid procedural response at the international level. This system would allow law enforcement officers from any participating country to promptly obtain an enforceable procedural document, on the basis of which social media and messaging app administrators would block groups and users.

To implement this proposal in practice, several conditions must be met:

1. Establish an international judicial body with a highly specialized mandate, handling only one category of cases**. It need not necessarily be established specifically as a court; in the initial stage, it could be an international organization with judicial functions that operates in a judicial format but is not a court in the legal sense.

2. Develop a uniform international format for presenting charges and evidence for consideration by this judicial body. This document must contain clear definitions of:

- who has the right to file a case with this judicial body;

- what charges may be filed and on what grounds;

- what type of petition must be submitted and how it must be drafted;

- what evidence must be submitted, in what form, and how it must be obtained;

- within what timeframe the request must be reviewed;

- what decisions the judicial body may render.

3. Encourage - on the basis of international treaties - not all, but at least the largest international corporations that own the most widely used social media platforms, messaging apps, and other information resources exploited for criminal purposes to cooperate with this organization. The essence of this cooperation lies in the adoption and enforcement of decisions issued by this judicial body to block (or impose other restrictive measures on) the activities of accounts, users, or communities for which there are sufficient grounds to suspect involvement in extremist, terrorist, or other activities related to the commission of, or the involvement of other persons (primarily minors) in, particularly serious crimes directed against the person, life, or health of individuals.

The international judicial body referred to in paragraph 1 need not necessarily be established as a separate entity under international law; given its limited functions and legal authority, it may well be established as a structural unit of one of the existing international organizations with special legal status - such as the United Nations, for example. Funding will be provided by the participating countries under a separate international treaty. Each participating country will have the right to bring cases before this judicial body within the scope of its jurisdiction and will undertake to pay membership dues for its maintenance and to enforce its decisions within its territory. For example, by equating a decision of this international judicial body - insofar as it pertains to restrictions on the dissemination of information - with a decision of a court within that state’s judicial system in terms of procedural status.

The judicial body itself will not be overly large in terms of organizational structure or staffing. The review of requests and the rendering of decisions will be a collegial process; in my opinion, the panel should consist of three judges who receive, review, consider, and render a decision on each submitted request within 60 hours. In certain emergency situations, this should be done within 12 hours. The credibility of the charges and the persuasiveness of the evidence will be assessed in light of generally accepted norms of national and international law. Accordingly, the judges must possess relevant knowledge of international law and sufficient practical experience in its application.

On average, each panel will be able to review up to 4 requests per week. Under current circumstances, the average caseload will be approximately 100 requests per month. I would like to remind you that this body will consider only a small fraction of crimes in the field of information security. These are direct, explicit threats of an extremist, terrorist, or other nature related to the commission of - or the involvement of others (primarily minors) in - particularly serious crimes directed against the person, life, or health of individuals. There are not many such crimes at present, but they fall into the category of the most socially dangerous, which is why they require the swiftest possible enforcement measures.

Based on preliminary figures, the total authorized staff of such a judicial body - including not only judges but also administrative and technical personnel - will number approximately 200 employees. For an international organization, this is not a large number; with at least 30 participating countries, funding would not be costly.

The main challenge will be convincing large international corporations - which own the most major social media platforms, messaging apps, and other information resources, most of which are used for criminal purposes - of the need for cooperation. Only then will it be possible to realize the key advantage of such a system: speed of response.

Promptly blocking communication channels and the dissemination of extremist material will significantly curtail the capabilities of destructive communities and, most importantly, hinder - and in some cases even dismantle - the system used to manage and coordinate illegal activities. This is particularly relevant now, as teenagers are increasingly being actively recruited to organize mass riots. I wrote about this as far back as 2023, when mass brawls and pogroms carried out by groups of teenagers from the «PMC Ryodan» subculture were reported in Russia and several neighboring countries. At the time, I suggested that these events were not random and that what we were witnessing were not spontaneous incidents, but rather planned and orchestrated processes. We can see a similar situation today in the U.S., where a wave of such crimes is underway, and they have even been given their own name: «Teen Takeover». Similar mass attacks, albeit on a smaller scale, have also been reported in Europe.

As an analysis of the incidents revealed, calls to commit illegal acts, information about meeting places, and the identification of targets, times, and locations of the attacks were carried out through social media communities, chat rooms, and messaging apps.

In conclusion to Part 3, I would like to remind you that the threat posed by «death groups» and other destructive online communities has long since become an international one. Advances in information technology and new forms and methods of communication have erased the boundaries between countries and continents. Unfortunately, criminals and extremists are actively exploiting this, and their communities have quickly become transnational. Under such conditions, a decentralized security system - where everyone is on their own - has become ineffective. We can only counter these threats by working together, consolidating our efforts on an international level, and taking a proactive, preemptive, and anticipatory approach. In this case, we have every chance of winning this battle for a safe future for our children.

In the next article, I will continue to share my proposals on countering the activities of «death groups». This will mark the conclusion of Phase 2, which is dedicated to developing effective practical solutions - the implementation of which will hinder the spread of information and recruitment, thereby reducing the influx of new recruits into extremist communities - and the transition to Phase 3, which focuses on specific tactical countermeasures.

* the psychotype of the members of this group, as well as the methods for identifying and influencing it, will be developed jointly by behavioral analysis specialists, based on the processing of personal data collected during the international group’s work. Further details are provided in Part 2.

** at the initial stage. However, given the growth and evolution of transnational threats in the field of information technology, the establishment of such a judicial body holds significant promise for future development, with its jurisdiction expanding to cover other categories of crimes.

Author: Roman Grishin

#schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #K-12 #764 #reddolphin #bluewhale #schoolshooting #research #criminology #deathgroups #extremism #terrorism #UN #CPTED #SHI #threat #TeenTakeover

Issues Regarding the Adaptation of the Project for the United States and Countries with an Autonomous (Independent) Education System

 

This article serves as a supplement to the previously published project on the main website - a comprehensive security system for schools and other educational institutions designed to protect against criminal, terrorist, and other threats. It was prompted by a critical review of the project that I received; its authors represent one of the most serious and authoritative international organizations in the field of educational facility security.

I will reiterate that I view criticism - especially constructive criticism - in a completely normal and respectful manner; it allows me to identify and address vulnerabilities and errors that are clearly visible from an outside perspective. I view all critical comments and well-reasoned recommendations - especially those from recognized experts and practitioners - as a form of self-education and always take them into account in my work. I have outlined my main arguments regarding the comments mentioned in the review in a separate article.

After receiving the main review, I received another letter from the same author, which no longer contained criticism but rather a recommendation to take into account, when developing the project, the specific features of how educational institutions are organized and operate in different countries - primarily in the United States. I will quote from the letter:

In the United States and many other countries, such as the United Kingdom and India, the government has very limited control over independent schools, and they operate as separate entities. In the United States, only one state has a public school system. That is precisely why the remaining 49 states have between 30 and 250 separate public school systems, which, although regulated by federal and regional governments, are administered by local authorities and enjoy significant autonomy. And this is not unique to the U.S., so keep in mind that there are significant differences between countries.

This letter served as an additional incentive for me: if even leading experts cannot see a way beyond the existing system, then this system has truly become a “comfort zone.” But a comfort zone is a place where growth stops. Meanwhile, threats are growing. And we are falling behind.

I am very familiar with the situation described by the expert; I have pointed out that I drew on the American experience as the basis for the units for the prevention and suppression of direct (explicit) threats outlined in the draft. Specifically, the experience of establishing and operating police services such as the New York City Police Department’s School Safety Division (SSD NYPD) and the Los Angeles School Police Department (LASPD). I studied their activities, legal status, and effectiveness in considerable detail, comparing them with other cities and states where similar police services exist or do not exist. At the same time, I studied, using open sources, the principles governing the organization and operations of educational institutions and childcare facilities in various states - including kindergartens, schools, colleges, and universities. I also examined the regulatory legal acts governing their status, the procedures for interacting with local and federal authorities, the police, and the community, as well as how security issues are addressed.

In short, based on an analysis of the information, it can be concluded that the school safety system in the United States does not have a single federal (state) standard and is managed at the state and local school district levels. Most schools employ the most basic measures: access control, video surveillance, the presence of police officers, school security personnel, or private security guards, and regular emergency drills. Within the administrative structures of local governments, school districts, and certain large schools, there are specialized staff positions (coordinators, directors, deputies, specialists, etc.) that are entirely focused on security issues. In some states, state law provides for the possibility of teachers carrying firearms and using them to stop an attack in cases of direct threats to themselves and students. The Department of Education and law enforcement leadership periodically send guidance materials on safety issues to schools, but all these documents are largely advisory in nature. Within the administrative structure - both at the state level and at the level of individual school districts - in addition to officials from the departments of education, there are various commissions, committees attached to school boards, and task forces responsible for overseeing security matters.

A system like this took shape as early as the second half of the last century, when the main security threats to students and school staff were teenagers who poured glue on the chairs of teachers they disliked, smoked in the schoolyard, broke light bulbs in the restroom, stole pastries from the cafeteria, or scrawled graffiti on the principal’s office door. Nowadays, the nature and severity of these threats have significantly increased and changed. Today, no one is surprised by serious and particularly serious crimes committed in schools - including those involving bladed weapons or firearms, sexual harassment, rape, theft, robbery, and extortion—or serving as a breeding ground for arms and drug dealers, organized crime gangs, and extremist groups. Yes, this situation does not exist in every school, but unfortunately, it is present in many, and the proportion of such schools (colleges, universities, etc.) is growing year by year.

Yes, it’s unpleasant to admit, but it’s a fact - in the 21st century, educational institutions have become high-risk environments.

The existing security system for educational institutions simply wasn’t designed to handle a situation like this. Yes, there have been many attempts to expand and modernize it, but the potential for modernization is limited, and it has now been exhausted. In its current state, the system is incapable of countering modern and emerging threats; it has become obsolete. This is not a criticism of its creators; it is a normal, natural process for any component of the state and municipal governance system. Over time, and under the influence of changes in the country’s social and political life, the system reaches the end of its useful life and becomes unsuitable for further use.

A system that is not updated to address new threats ceases to provide protection. It becomes a mere prop. We put locks on cardboard doors and then are surprised when they are broken into. This is exactly what we are witnessing right now.

In my project, I propose a new approach to ensuring the security of educational institutions. This framework has been developed with consideration for both existing and potential threats of all types—from criminal to natural and man-made. It is a new and unconventional approach based on the principle of centralization, in which schools and other educational institutions are not autonomous entities but rather components of a unified, managed system. However, I want to emphasize that this applies only to security matters; it will not affect other areas of operation in any way.

The first step in the project is administrative reform (Section III: Proposed Solution; Subsection 1: Administrative and Legal Measures; Paragraph 1.2), the essence of which is to completely relieve the administration of an educational institution of responsibility for organizing, ensuring, and maintaining public order and safety on its premises. This involves not only removing responsibility but also prohibiting interference in the process of organizing and implementing public order and safety. Only this will allow for the creation of a solid foundation upon which a transparent and effective system can be built in the future, where responsibilities are clearly delineated. Educational institutions will be able to focus on their primary mission - the education and upbringing of the younger generation.

This is a necessary condition; without it, there is no point in even beginning any reforms - they will yield no results. A major problem for public safety - and a significant boon to crime - is the competition among educational institutions to maintain their reputations and achieve positive statistical results. This compels their leadership to use any means necessary to conceal committed offenses from official record-keeping and full investigation until these incidents begin to lead to serious consequences and it becomes impossible to conceal them any longer. It is not uncommon for staff members to use their official positions to interfere with the work of security services, demanding that rules be disregarded for the sake of the educational process or other institutional priorities. The current (autonomous) security system allows them to do so, and criminals actively exploit this vulnerability. The result is obvious.

The only effective way to change the situation is to strip the administrations of educational institutions and education officials of any influence over safety issues. Safety matters should be handled exclusively by specialized professionals who possess the necessary expertise and resources. But most importantly, their top priority will be the lives and health of students and staff at the educational institution, rather than its reputation or statistical reporting.

A detailed model for creating a security system based on the principles of centralization and a clear chain of command—specifying the interdependencies and the impact of various elements on specific processes and the resolution of specific tasks—is outlined in the draft.

The issue of funding also depends on the willingness and approach to addressing it. When transitioning from a decentralized to a centralized security system, financial flows are also centralized; in other words, instead of 10 recipients, there will be one. Own funds (including those freed up by reducing the institution’s own contribution), municipal, regional, and federal subsidies, grants, donations, targeted funding, and co-financing under various programs. All funds are received by the “Specialized Police Service” (Section III: Proposed Solution; Subsection: 3. Prevention and Suppression of Direct Threats to Security). It also assumes full responsibility for all tasks related to the protection and security of educational institutions; details on how this will be implemented can be found in the draft (Section: III. Proposed Solution; Subsection: 3. Prevention and Suppression of Direct Threats to Safety). Funds are reallocated from some sources to others. This is not an increase in spending; it is a redistribution of existing funds to improve their effectiveness. Yes, expenses will rise initially—investments in infrastructure, technical equipment, and organizational costs will be needed—but eventually, costs will drop to current levels, and the budget will become more transparent and predictable. The question is, are we willing to spend these funds on an effective system rather than on a false sense of security? If we want results, we’ll have to invest in them - that’s a fundamental principle. In this case, the end justifies the means, because the goal is people’s lives and health - first and foremost, children, who, due to their age and limited life experience, cannot yet protect themselves, so we adults are responsible for their safety.

The project is fully suitable for implementation in the United States and other countries with a developed system of local self-government and an autonomous (independent) system of education. This is provided that local authorities deem it necessary to adopt it. A number of U.S. government officials, governors, senators, members of Congress, and public figures have spoken out about the need for concrete and effective measures to increase safety in educational institutions. Furthermore, based on an analysis of media publications, social media, and other online platforms for communication, discussion, and expressing one’s views, there is a growing public demand for such measures in the U.S., which means that similar initiatives will receive support.

I would add that implementing this project in the United States may even be easier than in any other country, as it already has a solid legal foundation for doing so. There is a well-established and developed system of local self-government, where local authorities can make organizational decisions without lengthy coordination with the federal government, as well as a local police force, which serves as the foundation for prevention and rapid response.

The main critical argument raised by my opponents is that the system I propose has not been tested in real-world conditions, and therefore its practical effectiveness has not been proven. I agree; this is indeed the case, which is why I myself state that it cannot be implemented immediately and across the board. First, an experiment is needed - a practical test of its effectiveness under real-world conditions - over the course of several years in a single state or even a single city.  Real-world testing will inevitably reveal certain shortcomings and oversights; this is the correct scientific approach and a normal working process for anything new. In just a few years, taking into account the corrections made to errors and shortcomings identified during the experiment, as well as the additions and improvements made, this will be a completely different model. The effectiveness and functionality of each of its elements will have been tested and proven in practice through repeated trials and verifications under various conditions and scenarios. A template whose effectiveness has been proven in practice can be used worldwide, with minor adjustments for local characteristics, but its fundamental foundation will remain the same - one that, drawing on international experience, will only become better and more reliable year after year.

The main outcome is that schools will once again become places where parents can send their children without fear - places that embody reliability, confidence, and safety. Places where children gain knowledge and life experience, make friends, and experience positive emotions. A place where administrative and teaching staff focus exclusively on their core mission - educating and nurturing the younger generation—while safety is the responsibility of professionals. I have dedicated my life to this cause and am confident that this is an achievable goal.

Knowing how pragmatic Americans are - and for me, this is an exceptionally positive quality - I invite you to take a look and assess the prospects and opportunities that creating such an international model for school safety systems opens up.

I first voiced this idea nearly 20 years ago, and over the years, my conviction has only grown stronger: that Safety will be the most valuable resource in the 21st century.

Author: Roman Grishin

#review #expert #USA #US #schoolsafety #educationalsafety #safety #security #K12 #opinion #position #comment #response #project #system #criticism #proposal #evaluation #threat #terrorism #crime

Project Review: Agreement, Disagreement, and Arguments

 

I recently received a review of my project to develop a school security system. It was written by one of the most reputable and authoritative international organizations in this field.

I won’t mention the organization’s name for two reasons:

1. I didn’t receive permission from its authors to do so;

2. so that this wouldn’t be seen as hidden advertising.

The review is critical but constructive. I respect the criticism and have decided not only to take it into account but also to address each point publicly—with respect for my opponents, but with clear counterarguments. Here’s what came of it:

Quote from the review: 1. When it comes to school safety, we must take into account the serious budget and staffing constraints that educational institutions face. The excessively high number of security personnel, technology, and so on that you propose is simply unrealistic even for the best-funded schools in the wealthiest countries, such as the United States.

My comment: I completely agree that the measures I’m proposing are expensive, but it’s worth asking: Can an effective security system for a facility where large numbers of people from a particularly vulnerable group gather - children and teenagers, who, due to their young age and lack of life experience, fall into this very category - really be cheap? I think the answer is obvious: it’s impossible in principle. Cheap security measures often do more harm than good, because parents believe their child is safe and protected at school, but when a dangerous incident occurs, the security system either fails to function as it should or doesn’t work at all. In general, any half-measures in the area of safety are like installing a gate without a fence, or putting an expensive, reliable lock on a door made of cardboard. Formally, they’re there, but in reality, they’re useless.

The issue of funding depends on the approach taken to address it. Let me clarify right away that I may be mistaken in some of my conclusions; I have based my analysis on information from open sources, as well as on reports from analytical agencies regarding crimes committed in U.S. educational institutions. Currently, most U.S. schools handle their own security independently. Schools operate autonomously when it comes to acquiring and using security equipment, developing regulations and protocols, and hiring security personnel and officials responsible for security matters. Local law enforcement agencies provide immediate response in emergency situations and are indirectly involved in the prevention of crimes and incidents. Municipal education departments—and in some cases, state-level departments (offices, bureaus, etc.) - are responsible for the safety of educational facilities. Additionally, there are individual officials, and in some cases, teams or units within police and fire departments that oversee these matters. All of these individuals need to be trained, and periodic additional training and professional development should be provided. There are also various municipal councils, inter-school councils, and other officials, administrative services, and community groups. There are various targeted programs aimed at improving safety, funded through the budget or grants, and much more. Simply put, there is money available in this area—and quite a lot of it - but the question is whether it is appropriate and effective to use it. Incidentally, the system in Russia is largely similar.

My proposal, as outlined in the draft, is to centralize these processes and consolidate tasks, functions, and funding into a single system. The first step in this process is to completely relieve school administrations of responsibility for the safety of educational institutions. Let school leadership, along with teaching and administrative staff, focus on education, student development, and extracurricular activities; safety should be handled by professionals. In this case, the school would allocate all available funds from its budget line items for security and safety, crime prevention, and accident prevention at educational facilities - as well as other expenses directly or indirectly related to this area—to a single specialized police service. This service ensures comprehensive security for the educational facility, both on and off school grounds, ranging from prevention to the elimination of direct threats. Equally important is the fact that this service bears full responsibility for this area of work. This service is established as a specialized unit but is part of the existing municipal police force, which significantly reduces the cost of its establishment and operations. More details about this service, its objectives, and capabilities can be found in the draft proposal.

It seems to me that the main problem here is not a lack of funds, but rather how wisely they are spent.

Quote from the review: 2. Furthermore, it is very important to realize that in the United States and most developed countries, the number of deaths from violence is significantly lower than the number of deaths from other causes, such as non-violence-related medical emergencies, children being struck by cars and school buses, etc. Although acts of violence resulting in mass casualties receive extensive media coverage, they are among the rarest causes of death in schools in the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, and, in my experience, in developing countries.  I am almost certain that if you had reliable data for Russia, the situation there would be the same or similar.  It is very important that the budgets and personnel allocated to security measures do not lead to an increase in the number of deaths because these risks are being overlooked — every year we face preventable fatalities because schools spend too much on measures to counter active shooters, while ignoring the dangers that claim the lives of far more students and staff.

My comment: I fully agree that the number of victims of mass killings and terrorist attacks in educational institutions in most countries’ accounts for less than 5% of the total number of deaths, injuries, and victims of other types of crimes. It’s just that these incidents receive less media and public attention. In Section «III. Proposed Solution», I listed the risks and threats that the implementation of the security measures specified in the project should significantly mitigate. These include:

1. Criminal and terrorist threats:

Property crimes:

- theft (of both personal properties belonging to students and staff and property belonging to the educational institution);

- extortion;

- robbery;

- armed robbery;

- fraud;

- intentional damage to or destruction of property (including both the personal property of students and staff and the property of the educational institution).

2. Crimes against the person (against both students and employees):

- assault;

- causing bodily harm of varying degrees of severity;

- insults;

- threats of murder or physical violence;

- sexual harassment, lewd acts;

- rape;

- defamation;

- stalking;

- bullying.

3. Crimes against public order and security:

- the formation and operation of organized criminal groups (gangs);

- the formation and operation of organized extremist groups;

- the dissemination of extremist ideology;

- involvement in criminal activity;

- involvement in extremist activity;

- involvement in groups and organizations whose activities are prohibited;

- hooliganism;

- illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition, and explosives;

- terrorism.

4. Crimes against public health:

- illicit drug trafficking;

- illicit trafficking in potent or toxic substances.

5. Non-criminal threats:

- traffic accidents;

- fires;

- dangerous animals;

- other natural or man-made emergencies that pose a direct threat to the life, health, or property of students, staff, or the educational institution.

At the same time, these same cases of mass killings are often the inevitable consequences of other crimes that preceded them - crimes that had been committed with impunity on school grounds over a long period of time. It is unpleasant to admit, but it is a fact that very often security personnel, teachers, and administrative staff at educational institutions are aware of threats, bullying, harassment, and other crimes taking place on campus, as well as the existence of informal extremist or criminal groups. They know, but they remain silent and do not intervene; the reasons vary - from fear and reluctance to get involved to a sense of powerlessness - and often these are deliberate actions by school leadership, an attempt to preserve the institution’s «reputation» and avoid negatively impacting its statistics. The solutions proposed as part of the project are designed to change this - to shift from passive observation to active intervention, threat forecasting, prevention, and early detection and suppression. The system is built on the principle of multifunctionality; it is designed to ensure children’s safety at all stages and against threats of any nature (including natural and man-made ones), from the moment they leave home for school until they return.

Quote from the review: 3. It is important to analyze the cost-benefit ratio of measures designed to protect human life. In other words, how likely is it that a particular measure will prevent serious injury or death, given the costs involved, and where, from a statistical standpoint, could these resources be better allocated.

My comment: I completely agree; a rational and balanced approach is at the core of this project. It is impossible to calculate all possible scenarios and risks purely hypothetically - practical testing is necessary. That is precisely why the concluding section of the project states that the proposed system has not been tested under real-world conditions, and therefore its practical effectiveness has not yet been proven. In any case, it cannot be implemented immediately and across the board; first, an experiment is needed - a practical test of its functionality under real-world conditions - over the course of several years in a single region or in several cities across different regions. Testing under real-world conditions will inevitably reveal certain shortcomings and oversights; this is a normal part of the process for anything new. In just a few years, taking into account the corrections made to errors and shortcomings identified during the experiment, as well as the additions and improvements made, this will be a completely different model. The effectiveness and functionality of each of its components will be verified and proven in practice through repeated testing and verification under various conditions and scenarios. It will be a template that can be used worldwide, with minor adjustments for local characteristics, but the foundation will remain the same—one that, drawing on international experience, will only become better and more reliable year after year.

Quote from the review: 4. We have several peer-reviewed studies conducted in the United States that show that school climate and culture, as well as student supervision, are among the most effective measures for preventing homicides, while the effectiveness of measures such as metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and the like has not been confirmed. As one example, see the 2016 Rand Corporation report on school security technologies.  Although it is important to note that school surveillance technology has advanced significantly since then, we know that we must be careful not to create a prison-like atmosphere, as this could actually increase the likelihood of school shootings.

My comment: I do not deny that creating a supportive and comfortable moral and psychological environment, maintaining a high cultural standard, and providing quality supervision of students are effective measures for preventing crime among students. The proposed bill does not hinder the implementation and use of measures aimed at fostering a positive environment, culture, and supervision in educational institutions; all of these can coexist without interfering with one another. They simply serve different purposes. Technical security and monitoring measures are effective when applied correctly. I have read the 2016 Rand Corporation study and fully agree that, at the time of publication, the use of metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and other such devices had not demonstrated particular effectiveness; I would add that even now, 10 years later, the situation has not improved. Technology has advanced significantly, yet the effectiveness of its use has remained at the same level. The reason is that, in most cases, these measures are used haphazardly. One of the project’s most important objectives is to address this very problem: to integrate individual technical security measures into a single automated security system (section: «III. Proposed Solution»; subsection: «4. Technical Security Measures»; section «Multifunctional Software and Hardware Complex»). This will greatly increase their capabilities and effectiveness, transforming them into an effective tool for preventing and suppressing offenses.

Quote from the review: 5. I am skeptical of some of the technologies you propose, as I do not believe they are reliable enough to justify the associated costs.  I served as an expert witness in a U.S. Federal Trade Commission investigation into false advertising claims by companies manufacturing AI-powered weapon detectors, and these devices absolutely do not do what the manufacturers promised - and still do not.  For example, they fail to detect 9mm micro-pistols in about 45% of cases - not to mention situations where security personnel are not paying attention, and without taking into account attempts to bypass security checkpoints - 9mm micro-pistols currently account for about 25% of all pistol sales in the U.S. - my carry pistol holds 13 rounds, and I have yet to visit a single facility where they are used where I wasn’t confident I could bring it into the secured area. Furthermore, having worked with the seven largest public school systems in the country and many modern, medium-sized school districts (each with 100,000 students), I have come to the conclusion that attempting to implement too many high-tech systems leads to serious disruptions, since people are unable to manage that much technology — we face the same problems in casinos, where huge sums are invested in security technology and personnel, yet on any given day, between 20 and 205 surveillance cameras can be taken out of service—even though their budgets far exceed that of a school district. When drawing up a budget, it is essential to account for the costs of the entire IT staff—not only for installation but also for ensuring the smooth operation of systems, updates, cybersecurity, and so on.  This often results in very large budget allocations.  Another important factor is the existing infrastructure.  Many large, open-plan buildings in Florida and California lack modern infrastructure, so running electrical wiring and fiber-optic cable for each camera, access control device, sensor, etc., can cost $3,000—and this is often the case.  For example, in one project we completed in 2018, installing a single $300 surveillance camera cost $3,000.

My comment: I fully understand the expert’s skepticism; in fact, at first, I myself was very skeptical of AI-based security technology. But technology is advancing, and the solutions being offered are becoming increasingly effective. I had the opportunity to personally observe a modern X-ray scanner used by transportation security personnel, where the signal is processed not only by the operator but also by AI. Currently, this system is capable of recognizing and identifying not only the gun itself but also its individual components in approximately 95% of cases. Importantly - especially given its priceм - the device itself has significant potential for upgrades; it does not require replacement of the unit or its individual parts (except for routine maintenance) - updating and enhancing its software is sufficient.

Every year, technology becomes higher quality, more accessible, and less expensive; the number of communication methods, wireless connectivity options, and remote control capabilities increases; and the speed and bandwidth of communication channels grow. Connecting and replacing equipment is becoming easier, faster, and less expensive. The project does not call for the installation of particularly expensive equipment (except for introscopes); everything else falls within the mid-range price segment, offers a high level of reliability and energy efficiency (low power consumption), and some components - such as pressure-sensitive sensors - are among the simplest, cheapest, and most reliable available. But as I mentioned earlier in Answer No. 4, the technology itself is not what matters most; what matters is exactly how it is used. In this regard, I would like to highlight another key principle of the project: technology should complement and enhance human capabilities, not replace them.

Quote from the review: 6. As mentioned earlier, measures to identify problematic behavior and intervene are at least as effective—and, in my experience, often even more effective—than many school security technologies. Furthermore, they generally provide a much higher return on investment than many more expensive approaches, such as electronic weapon screening.

My comment: With all due respect to the expert’s qualifications, professional competence, and experience, I disagree with this statement. This is a one-sided approach; while it may be effective to some extent against internal threats, we must not forget that internal attacks account for only 52–54% of crimes committed in schools and other educational institutions. How can we counter them using these methods? A telling example is the attack on Covenant School in Nashville on March 27, 2023. According to a statement by Nashville Police Chief John Drake, published in «The Tennessean», the school was not the perpetrator’s original target. According to Drake, Hale had planned to attack another location, but it turned out to be too well-protected, so the perpetrator chose the school as a less secure target. If we focus all our efforts in only one direction, schools will become attractive, easy targets for mass murderers. This is especially true now that extremist groups such as «764», «NLM», «Red Dolphin», «Columbine», «Killer Cult Maniacs», and others like them have effectively declared schools, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children gather to be their targets. The first high-profile killings have already taken place. The question is, what can we do to counter them?

Let me reiterate: I do not deny that creating a supportive and comfortable moral and psychological environment, maintaining a high cultural standard, and providing quality supervision of students are effective measures for preventing crime among students. But if we rely solely on these measures, scenarios like the one at Covenant School will recur regularly.

 

In conclusion, I would like to sincerely thank the experts for taking the time and making the effort to provide such detailed and honest feedback. I greatly value your experience, as well as your objectivity and candor in your assessments and conclusions.

I am grateful for your specific comments; I will definitely take them into account as I refine the project, but overall, I will continue to move toward a systemic approach, which I consider the most promising.

Our perspectives do indeed stem from different paradigms: you view schools as autonomous entities, while I view them as elements of a single, managed system. I do not believe that either approach is absolutely right or wrong - they both solve the same problem, just in different ways. Time will tell which one is more effective.

However, I would like to say that I fully understand that there are currently many administrative, financial, and legal challenges, and that making the necessary changes to the system is difficult—and in some cases, impossible. So perhaps we shouldn’t get bogged down in discussions of existing barriers, but rather acknowledge that the current system is outdated and requires serious modernization, taking into account current and future threats that it is unable to address. Criminals and terrorists face no bureaucratic obstacles; they refine their methods much faster than we do, and we have already fallen seriously behind them—a gap that continues to widen, and it is certainly not in our favor. The question is which strategy to choose: to look for excuses for inaction or to start looking for ways to stay one step ahead.

Author: Roman Grishin

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The “Public Order and Safety” portal now has a Telegram channel

 

Dear colleagues and readers!
Today, August 1, 2026, our Telegram channel has been created and launched.
This is the official channel of the international portal «Public Order and Safety».
This community is designed to bring together and facilitate communication among people who are involved in or interested in applied criminology, issues of public order and security, and the prevention and counteraction of crime and terrorism.
This is not a place for those who are only interested in discussing problems and assigning blame, or for those who talk about politics and conspiracy theories. 
This is a place only for those who:
- study existing and potential threats;
- seek and propose practical solutions for identifying, preventing, and countering these threats.
We invite you to join the conversation and discussion.
We’d especially appreciate it if you’d share this link in relevant communities.
Sincerely,

the Editor-in-Chief.