Poisoning as a Weapon in Schools: A New Threat Scenario (part 2)

 

Earlier this year, I wrote about an incident at a Russian school where a 14-year-old student brought a set of chemicals to school, selected one of the dangerous and toxic reagents, deliberately mixed it into a drink, and then offered the poisoned soda to his classmates. Three teenagers were affected, but everything turned out well; thanks to the competent actions of medical professionals, they were discharged from the hospital the very next day.

In the same report, I conducted a brief analysis of the proportion of crimes committed using toxic chemicals out of the total number of attacks - including those with signs of mass murder and terrorist acts - committed in schools and other educational institutions. Over 26 years of observation, there were five such cases, two of which occurred in 2025.

In 2026, the increase in the number of crimes committed using toxic chemicals continued; in just nine months, there were eight such attacks - a 60% increase compared to the previous 26 years:

January 21, Kuyuki, Russia;

February 10, London, United Kingdom;

March 19, Selaya, Mexico;

March 26, Chelyabinsk, Russia;

March 27, Calama, Chile;

September 1, 2026, Kansk, Russia;

September 8, Portland, USA;

September 18, 2026, Rome, Italy.

In 6 cases, the perpetrators used toxic substances as auxiliary weapons; in 5 cases, it was tear gas, and in 1 case, the attacker used a household insecticide in an aerosol can.

Two cases deserve special attention: the one on January 21 in Russia, which I mentioned earlier, and the recent incident at Benson Polytechnic High School in Portland, USA.

A 15-year-old student brought household chemicals - which are freely available for purchase - from home to school and then mixed them in the school cafeteria. As a result of a chemical reaction, extremely toxic and dangerous gases began to be released and spread rapidly throughout the room. The suspect himself lost consciousness at the scene after inhaling the toxic fumes and was hospitalized in critical condition. Seven people required medical attention, and more than 100 students and school staff were evacuated as a precaution.

If we assess the situation objectively, we can say that everything turned out all right - no one other than the perpetrator himself was seriously injured. However, the situation is more complicated than it seems at first glance. Based on an analysis of media reports and statements by police and FBI officials, this crime was planned and carried out with the active participation of online extremist communities - or, as they are also known, «Death groups» - operating on social media and messaging apps.

I cannot say for certain - this is merely one theory among many - that the teenager did not devise the attack plan himself; in this case, he was merely the perpetrator. It is likely that those behind the organization of this crime needed to carry out an attack that would result in mass casualties and generate significant public outcry. Poisonous substances are a type of weapon well-suited for such an operation. Furthermore, judging by the instructions and chemical components found on the perpetrator during a search, in addition to poisonous substances, he also planned to use homemade explosive devices. And that represents an entirely different level of threat. An explosive device that causes not only thermal, blast, and shrapnel damage (if it contains projectiles) but also deliberate chemical poisoning is, in effect, the use of a weapon of mass destruction - albeit on a local scale.

In this case, it is most likely that the perpetrator acted on his own initiative, carrying out the attack earlier than his handlers had planned and failing to properly execute the task assigned to him. If this is the case, there will soon be new attacks on schools and other educational institutions following a similar pattern. When carrying out these attacks, the perpetrators will take into account and correct the mistakes and miscalculations they made during the planning and execution of the attack at Benson High School in Portland.

What should be done?

If we ask what schools and other educational institutions can currently do to counter criminals and terrorists, the answer - as sad as it may be - offers little cause for optimism. The growing number of attacks in 2026 (in just nine months, the all-time highs set in 2025 and 2014 have already been surpassed) clearly indicates that educational facilities have always been - and remain - easy targets for criminals. None of the security measures touted by the authorities and law enforcement agencies are working.

A few years ago, while working on the Comprehensive Security System for Educational Facilities project, I took into account the likelihood that criminals might use chemical agents. Therefore, the project includes measures for both preventing and countering this type of threat. However, to date, this project has not been implemented anywhere, not even on a pilot basis; therefore, we will proceed based on the actual capabilities available—there aren’t many, but they do exist.

1. Restrict access to chemical reagents in school buildings and other educational institutions.

If the security checkpoint does not have a scanner with a content analysis system, or if a thorough inspection of all backpacks is not conducted, the only thing security personnel and school administrators can focus on is paying attention to large quantities of liquids being brought in. It is important to understand that a school is typically a building with large rooms, wide hallways, high ceilings, large windows, and an extensive ventilation system. This means that to effectively cause harm with toxic substances, a high concentration in the air is required - and therefore, a significant quantity of the substances themselves is needed.

This is a vulnerability that must be exploited: it is impossible to smuggle in a large volume covertly; it must be brought in little by little over several stages, which means it must be stockpiled and stored somewhere. Security and school staff must take these circumstances into account and organize their work in such a way as to block both possible channels* wherever possible.

The task is made somewhat easier by the fact that we are dealing not with professional smugglers, but with amateurs with extremely limited and, for the most part, theoretical experience in such activities. Although they consider themselves smarter than others, in most cases they are not.

It is equally important to keep in mind that chemical reagents are also present within the school itself - in the chemistry, physics, and biology labs, the first-aid room, and the storage room for cleaning and disinfecting supplies. Measures must be taken to prevent unauthorized access to these areas. At a minimum: secure doors and locks, at least a basic alarm system to detect unauthorized entry, and placement within the field of view of surveillance cameras.

2. Rehearsing procedures in the event of a threat involving the release of toxic substances.

Developing (if none exists) and incorporating into the educational institution’s existing safety protocol a detailed procedure for officials to follow in the event of an attack involving toxic chemicals. It is best to invite someone with practical experience in addressing such threats, such as from relevant government agencies or the military. Ideally, this person should conduct a site inspection of the school and participate as an observer during practical drills. Based on the results of these observations, they will make additional revisions to the safety protocol and provide recommendations on organizing drills and training exercises according to the specified scenario.

One or more staff members of the educational institution should undergo training in specialized courses on responding to emergencies involving the use of toxic substances. Not a formal online course that provides a certificate rather than knowledge, but a real, in-person course taught by instructors with actual experience in this field. This is necessary because at the very beginning, when a threat is identified, one of two possible decisions must be made: evacuation or containment.  The number of casualties, the extent of harm to their health, and other negative consequences of the threat depend directly on the correctness of this decision. To make the right decision, one must understand both the threat itself and the processes involved - and this requires knowledge.

3. Personal Protective Equipment and Threat Mitigation Measures.

Educational institutions must purchase at least a minimum quantity of respiratory personal protective equipment for the most vulnerable categories of staff and students (e.g., those with health or mobility limitations).

Train staff on how to implement primary measures to neutralize and mitigate the negative consequences of a threat using available technical resources. For example, smoke exhaust valves - which are found in many educational institutions as part of fire safety systems - can be used in this case to provide forced ventilation of the room. Activating them promptly can significantly reduce the concentration of toxic substances in the air within a short period of time.

These simple and relatively inexpensive measures will allow schools and other educational institutions, as well as organizations where large numbers of children gather, to at least slightly reduce the risk of an attack involving chemical agents. And in the event that such an attack does occur, they will significantly mitigate its negative consequences, primarily in terms of the number of fatalities and injuries.

All of the above are passive measures aimed solely at containing the threat and mitigating its consequences. We cannot rely solely on them or on the assumption that the next criminal will make another mistake; such a strategy is disastrous. Extremist groups like «764», «Red Dolphin», «Maniacs: Cult of Killers», «NLM», and others like them have, in effect, declared open war on society, targeting its most vulnerable members – children - as their victims. The question is: what comes next? Will we continue to pretend that nothing is happening, or will we begin to respond—not with passive deterrence, but aggressively and decisively?

I invite everyone who cares about this issue to participate in an applied project aimed at countering online extremist communities - or, as they are also known, «Death groups» - on social media and messaging apps. This has long ceased to be a problem for a single country or even a single continent; it is a global threat, and we can only confront it by working together.

* Many of you are probably wondering: What exactly are these measures? Yes, I am deliberately not revealing all the details. Which elements of the security system limit a criminal’s capabilities - and how and why they do so - remains, in part, beyond the scope of this article. Why? Because this article is publicly available. It’s read not only by those interested in child safety, but also by those with directly opposing intentions. Experts in cause-and-effect relationships will understand without any hints. And I have no intention of giving advice to malicious actors.

Author: Roman Grishin

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The Philippines - A Series of Attacks on Schools in 2026. Proposals for Measures to Prevent and Curb Such Threats in the Future.

 

Note: English is not my native language, so I use an automated translation system to communicate. I apologize in advance if the meaning of some phrases is conveyed incorrectly. 

In the summer of 2026, the school safety situation in the Philippines—which had been relatively calm up to that point - changed dramatically. Tragedies followed one after another:

June 16, General Trias

an attack on a middle school involving a bladed weapon (knife); 7 victims (0 killed, 7 injured); the perpetrator was a 14-year-old female student at the school at the time of the crime; the suspect was apprehended at the scene;

June 22, Tacloban

a group attack on a high school involving firearms (a semi-automatic pistol and a revolver), 8 victims (3 killed, 5 wounded); the perpetrators (two) were males, aged 14 and 15 at the time of the crime, students at the school; one suspect was apprehended at the scene, while the second fled but was later captured alive;

August 18, Zamboanga

attack on a high school involving the use of firearms (a semi-automatic pistol), 24 victims (1 killed, 23 injured); the perpetrator was a 15-year-old male student at the school; the suspect committed suicide at the scene; the crime was livestreamed online;

September 18, Banga

An attack on a high school involving a firearm (a semi-automatic pistol); 10 victims (2 killed, 8 wounded); the perpetrator was a male, 16 years old at the time of the crime, a student at the school; the suspect committed suicide at the scene of the crime.

I would like to add another incident to this, which, although not a mass killing, is necessary for a comprehensive analysis of the situation. This is the case that occurred on June 19, 2026, at a public school in Cavite City. There, during a personal dispute between two students on school grounds, one of the participants used a knife to inflict bodily injury on his opponent; the victim was hospitalized.

The situation in the Philippines is a clear example of what years of policies that ignore and deny probable—and, most importantly, quite obvious—threats lead to. Destructive online communities (such as 764, Red Dolphin, NLM, Maniacs: Cult of Killers, Columbine, etc.) that promote and incite aggression among teenagers have been operating on an international scale for several years now. Their activity has only been growing with each passing year, and social media, messaging apps, and gaming platforms have long since erased state and national borders. It was only a matter of time before a tragedy occurred in Southeast Asia that would set off a chain reaction. Why did it happen specifically in the Philippines? Because that’s where it was easiest to carry out.

I closely followed developments after the first tragedy, monitored reports in local and international media, gathered information from other open sources, and observed the authorities’ response.

After visiting Bangu, Philippine Education Secretary Sonny Angara officially acknowledged: «Schools have traditionally focused on academics, with huge gaps in physical security». It was precisely the fact that the mere presence of security personnel did not prevent the tragedy that forced the government to take extreme measures:

- shifting some affected regions to online learning;

- revising security protocols;

- allocating funds to purchase walk-through metal detectors for schools;

- the introduction in several provinces of mandatory transparent backpacks for all students.

These measures are common and often implemented after such tragedies, but they are largely ineffective because they create only the appearance of protection; more importantly, they do not address the actual causes of the tragedies. I decided to examine the situation in greater detail.

I always begin my analysis with a chronology of events; that is where one can identify the vulnerabilities that the perpetrator exploited to commit the crime. I will reiterate that I do not have access to police reports or the findings of situational analyses (if any were conducted at all), so I relied solely on information from open sources.

What we found:

1. In all 5 incidents (100%), these were internal attacks—that is, they were carried out by students or staff members of these educational institutions. Incidentally, this is not typical for Asia, where most such attacks are external;

2. In all cases, the suspects used weapons they had brought with them;

3. In all cases, the schools were under security, but in one of the incidents, the perpetrator was not apprehended by school security. The apprehension was carried out either by teachers or by police officers who arrived on the scene. In many schools, security duties are carried out not by employees of private security companies or the police, but by local “Tanod” volunteer groups. Tanod members have volunteer status and are effectively unable to have any real impact on the security of the facilities they guard.

4. In one instance (June 22, 2026, Tacloban), a criminal attempted to flee the scene and succeeded; he managed to exit the school grounds and hide in one of the houses, where he was subsequently apprehended.

5. In two cases, the perpetrators committed suicide.

These facts lead to the following conclusions:

1. There is no system for predicting and preventing threats at the national or regional level, or such a system is not functioning;

2. There is no system for identifying students prone to aggression and unlawful acts, or such a system is not functioning;

3. It is possible to bring oversized weapons of any type into schools unimpeded;

4. Physical security exists only in name, for appearances’ sake; its effectiveness in identifying, preventing, responding to, and suppressing obvious threats is practically zero;

5. The speed and effectiveness of the police response to incidents in educational institutions are very low.

Overall conclusion: Schools and other educational institutions in the Philippines are poorly secured facilities and easy targets for criminals. This is largely due to a relatively long period of calm and the absence of serious crimes in Philippine educational institutions. Over the past 25 years, the Philippines has appeared in statistics on serious crimes committed in educational institutions only three times (in 2001, 2010, and 2022), and only one of those incidents was a mass murder—the Zamboanga massacre in October 2010. For a country like the Philippines, this figure is very low. In 2026, the situation changed dramatically: more attacks were committed in three months than in the previous quarter-century. There are several reasons for this:

1. the rapid development of digital technologies and online communications;

2. the growth and popularity of extremist movements and ideologies, especially among young people;

3. the near-total absence of effective prevention, deterrence, and countermeasures against extremist movements and their ideologies;

4. a perfunctory approach to ensuring security at schools, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children gather;

5. the low level of preparedness of police services to respond to incidents at educational institutions.

This situation has arisen not only in the Philippines but in the vast majority of Southeast Asian countries; the only exception is Singapore, where security issues are given special attention. Judging by statements in the media, Philippine authorities have recognized the full danger of the situation and the systemic problems that led to it. Countermeasures are currently being actively developed and implemented. The previously announced Comprehensive School Safety Act is set to serve as the fundamental basis for the Philippines’ strategy on ensuring the safety of educational institutions. Currently, this is Bill No. 2426, which is before the Senate and is in the process of being reviewed and approved.

I was unable to find the full text of the bill, but the general structure of the document is known. It is based on three main pillars:

1. Prevention and Mitigation of Threats.

This regulates how schools must prepare for threats before they materialize. The Department of Education, in collaboration with the police, must conduct a comprehensive audit of each school’s perimeter vulnerabilities. Standards for the physical security of school campuses, which include the mandatory installation of video surveillance systems, the use of walk-through or handheld metal detectors, and the construction of secure perimeter fences. Strict regulations are established regarding the admission of unauthorized persons to the premises and the inspection of students’ backpacks when there are compelling reasons to do so. Expanding the staff of psychologists and their assistants to work directly in schools with students, identifying depression, suicidal tendencies, and bullying at early stages.

2. Emergency Response.

This section describes the actions of staff, students, and emergency services during an emergency. Mandatory regular training sessions for teachers and students on various scenarios involving attacks and other criminal acts are introduced. Direct communication channels with the police and emergency services are established. A mandatory lockdown protocol is implemented to minimize casualties until police SWAT teams arrive.

3. Recovery and Rehabilitation.

The government will fund long-term psychological and psychosocial rehabilitation for affected students and their family members. Regulations are being introduced to specify how schools should resume in-person instruction following tragedies (including the temporary incorporation of online classes and adjustment periods).

In addition, the Senate is considering another related but separate bill, «On Children’s Online Safety», which introduces a series of measures aimed at combating cyberbullying and the dissemination of extremist material.  It restricts teenagers’ access to harmful content and establishes an obligation for internet service providers and school administrations to respond to online harassment.

I repeat: at the time of writing, I did not have the full texts of these documents; I assessed them based on information about their content published in open sources.

Overall, this is a sound legislative initiative, though in my opinion it is premature. Let me explain why: while it is appropriate to regulate such matters through federal laws, this should only be done when there is a clear understanding of exactly how the law will be applied in practice. This is especially true when the law regulates legal relationships that are entirely new to the state and have not been subject to such regulation in the past. As the law is implemented, numerous circumstances and situations will arise that are not covered by it, or are covered but not fully, or where the new law conflicts with existing ones. This is all the more true given that, under pressure from public outcry, this law is currently being adopted on an expedited basis. There will be many legal loopholes, and eliminating them will be difficult and time-consuming, because the procedure for amending federal law is not a quick one, and many amendments will be needed, especially in the first few years of implementation. Therefore, such an «unpolished» law will initially create more difficulties and legal and administrative barriers than it will eliminate.

The biggest mistake the Philippine authorities could make would be to try, in response to public pressure, to act immediately and simultaneously on all fronts, while expecting quick results. Such a strategy can lead to only one outcome—complete failure. They need to realistically assess their capabilities, and the reality is that the Philippine authorities simply do not have the technical, administrative, and—most importantly—human and financial resources to build a comprehensive security system in educational institutions. This is a fairly lengthy process that requires phased implementation.

The best solution would be to focus efforts on the following areas, which are no less important but more achievable at this time:

1. Analytics and forecasting.

2. Containing and reducing internal aggression.

3. Improving the effectiveness of rapid response teams.

4. An administrative and legal framework.

5. Creating conditions for the development of human and professional resources.

Let’s examine these areas in a bit more detail.

 

1. Analysis and Forecasting:

1.1. Assessment of the Overall Situation.

To begin with, it is necessary to carefully examine all educational institutions in the country, as well as other critically important and potentially hazardous facilities where large numbers of children and adolescents gather. To this end, a unified assessment system based on specific, formal criteria must be developed and implemented. A ready-made format, such as the «Educational Institution Safety Scale», can be used, or a custom format can be developed.

Next, experts sort and conduct selective verification of the submitted information, breaking down the data by regions, provinces, and individual municipalities. The final report will take the form of an «Educational Institutions Safety Atlas», which will provide an overview of the safety situation at educational and childcare facilities across the country. However, this information should be accessible only to relevant specialists. The final document, as well as the data collected during its creation, must be classified as restricted access.

1.2. Individual Security Assessment of Facilities.

After assessing the overall situation nationwide, experts proceed to conduct an individual assessment of each facility to identify and evaluate existing vulnerabilities, develop specific recommendations for addressing the identified shortcomings, and monitor the results. Furthermore, based on this data, a unique «Security Protocol» must be developed for each facility. This should not be the kind of generic, one-size-fits-all instructions currently in use, but rather a document tailored specifically to each facility, taking into account its unique characteristics and features; it must contain specific (individual) tasks for each official in the event of an emergency. This document must have restricted access; its contents must not be disclosed to anyone outside the list of officials specified therein.

 

Who will carry this out, and how should the process be organized?

According to Bill No. 2426, this task falls to the Department of Education in collaboration with the police, who are responsible for conducting a comprehensive vulnerability audit of every school. This immediately raises the question: Do these two agencies—in every province and every municipality—have a sufficient number of practitioners who know how to identify and assess such vulnerabilities? I can say with certainty that they do not, because this is not their area of expertise at all. This work must be carried out by experts with a completely different professional background. Equally important is that they must be independent of the National Police and the Department of Education; otherwise, their assessments and conclusions will be biased and tailored to serve departmental interests (following the principle of «maximum budget, minimum accountability»).

A more effective solution in every sense would be to establish a state (or quasi-state) organization for threat assessment and prevention. For example, in the form of a government agency with the following tasks:

- monitoring, assessing, and analyzing existing and potential threats;

- developing effective methods to counter these threats, reduce the likelihood of their successful execution, and mitigate their probable consequences, particularly human casualties;

- ongoing auditing and evaluation of the effectiveness of security systems in existing and future educational institutions (during the design of new facilities or major renovations of existing ones), as well as in places where large numbers of children gather;

- preparation of comprehensive and well-founded assessments of identified vulnerabilities in security systems, along with the development of specific recommendations for addressing them;

- providing additional training and professional consulting to employees of private security services and law enforcement agencies regarding the security of educational institutions and locations where large numbers of children gather;

- developing and implementing unique «Security Protocols» for educational institutions and locations where large numbers of children gather, based on the specific characteristics of each facility;

- conducting theoretical and practical sessions, training programs, and drills with teaching and administrative staff at educational institutions and locations where large numbers of children gather, on how to respond to various emergency situations;

- representing the interests of the state, joining, initiating, and participating in the work of international organizations and professional communities in the relevant field of activity.

This is the primary expert, analytical, and administrative body within the state’s executive branch responsible for the safety of educational and other children’s institutions. It develops and subsequently revises the national strategy on this issue, and plans, implements, and monitors all stages of its implementation.

Further details on exactly how such an agency should operate, an example of its organizational and staffing structure, as well as the opportunities its creation and operation could provide to the state, are outlined in the draft comprehensive system for ensuring the safety of educational institutions, section «II. Technical Strength and Security of Facilities».

 

2. Controlling and reducing internal aggression.

2.1. Identifying potential threats and «high-risk groups».

Bill No. 2426 provides for an increase in the number of psychologists and their assistants to work directly in schools with students, identifying depression, suicidal tendencies, and bullying at early stages. The most important aspect of this measure will be its proper implementation. It is important not to chase statistical targets or rush implementation, as this could lead to very unfortunate consequences. It often happens that demand exceeds supply in the skilled labor market. In such cases, employers begin to lower their quality requirements for a candidate’s qualifications and professional experience, simply to fill the vacancy and report to upper management that the necessary specialist has been hired and has begun their duties.

The focus should not be on the number of staff positions filled or the speed at which they are filled, but rather on the professional caliber of the specialists being hired. After all, not every psychologist is suitable for this purpose; a university degree alone is not enough. We need specialists with a narrow focus who have undergone additional training under the guidance of experts with real practical experience working with adolescents who have committed or planned to commit particularly serious crimes, who were members of extremist communities and terrorist organizations, who were “followers” of banned online criminal communities such as «764», «NLM», «Red Dolphin», «Maniacs: Cult of Killers» and the like, as well as supporters of the «Columbine» movement. They must acquire professional skills not only in identifying «at-risk» adolescents but also in preventing their emergence, working with them and their families, correcting their behavior, strengthening their moral and psychological resilience, and freeing them from the control of manipulators. This cannot be learned in a three-day online seminar.

I don’t think there are enough specialists of this caliber in the Philippines to staff even 10% of all the country’s educational institutions. However, I believe there are more than enough to establish several large professional development centers for training such specialists. In addition to initial training through professional development programs, these training centers could host periodic seminars and academic conferences to facilitate the exchange of expertise, including with foreign specialists. This would enable the Philippines to lay the foundation for its own high-quality scientific and practical infrastructure in this field within a few years.

2.2. Reducing the activity and numbers of potential members of «high-risk groups».

As an effective deterrent to reduce the number of potential victims, I would suggest that the leadership of the Philippine Department of Education consider implementing an approach such as CPTED.

CPTED stands for «Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design» — an approach aimed at reducing crime by altering the physical environment in which it occurs. The essence of the concept is that a well-designed physical space can prevent crime, deter undesirable behavior, and strengthen community ties.

The effectiveness of this method in reducing violence in educational institutions has been confirmed by many years of practical research conducted by Safe Havens International (SHI)—one of the world’s oldest and most experienced expert and analytical organizations specializing in improving safety in educational institutions.

For more details on CPTED implementation methods and the results achieved, see the articles by SHI Executive Director Michael Dorn, a recognized international expert in the field of school safety and security.

Although creating a more supportive emotional and psychological environment does not solve all safety issues and does not have a guaranteed effect on all at-risk adolescents, research shows that the use of such methods can reduce levels of anxiety, stress, and aggression among some adolescents by 10–15%, and thus reduce the number of potential offenders and victims.

 

3. Improving the effectiveness of rapid response teams.

An analysis of the sequence of tragic events at Philippine schools this year revealed that rapid response teams deployed to incidents at educational institutions acted, first, slowly, and second, ineffectively. The perpetrators were able to carry out their plans, and in one case, the suspect not only killed and wounded several people but also managed to flee the scene. This is not a criticism of the Philippine police; the reason lies elsewhere—in a lack of experience in responding to such situations. To put this in perspective, the last mass shooting at a Philippine school occurred 16 years ago, and consequently, the police had been focused on other, more common types of crimes. I assume that for this same reason, no one developed any specific protocols for responding to such situations, and even if they existed, they remained purely theoretical.

Standard tactical response protocols for incidents involving the use of weapons do not apply to educational institutions. These are confined spaces with large numbers of people—and not just people, but children—who, due to their age and limited life experience, behave unpredictably in such situations. This applies to both the victims and the perpetrators, who, as a rule, are also still children. The logic that guides typical adult criminals with selfish or personal motives does not apply to them.

Initially, efforts should be focused on two main areas:

1. Response speed;

2. Response effectiveness.

As for speed, according to Bill No. 2426, the correct decision has already been made: all schools must be equipped with several types of direct communication channels to the police. I believe this refers to two main types: two-way communication (via telephone or intercom) and one-way communication in the form of an emergency alarm button to call the police. In addition, attention should be paid to adjusting the patrol routes of outdoor police units so that, during school hours, patrol density in the vicinity of schools and other educational institutions is maximized. In areas where several educational facilities are concentrated and in places where large numbers of children gather, it would be prudent to establish a permanent police post.

To improve the effectiveness of police responses, changes must be made to the initial training program for patrol officers, and a continuing education program for current officers must be developed and implemented. Schools—and indeed any other educational institution—are tactically complex environments for the police; therefore, specific skills are required to take proactive and effective action to neutralize threats in such areas and buildings. This applies not only to patrol officers themselves but also to dispatch center personnel, who manage police forces and resources at the scene of an incident from the moment an emergency call is received.

The best solution, as in the case of psychologists, would be to establish a separate training center in the country dedicated to developing and implementing effective police tactics for neutralizing threats in educational institutions and places where large numbers of children gather. This center would bring together the most experienced specialists in this field, and experts from other countries could be invited periodically (there are good training programs in the U.S. and Israel). This center will not train police officers directly; rather, it will train and provide continuing education for instructors at standard police recruit training centers, continuing education programs for active-duty officers, police academies, and private security schools.

In addition to training, knowledge and skills must be reinforced through practice; members of police patrol units should periodically participate in drills and training exercises based on various scenarios at educational facilities. This will allow them to maintain the necessary skills, as well as to better understand and remember the specific features of the buildings and surrounding areas of schools and other educational institutions along their patrol routes. Such knowledge will enable them to orient themselves more easily and quickly at the scene of an incident in the event of a real emergency.

 

4. Administrative and Legal Framework.

Consider amending all current legislation governing the activities of institutions and organizations in early childhood, elementary, secondary (general and vocational), and higher education to completely relieve the administration of educational institutions of responsibility for organizing, ensuring, and maintaining public order and safety on the premises of the educational institution.

This is a key prerequisite from which the development of a security system must begin. The leadership and staff of an educational institution should focus exclusively on the educational process and on resolving related administrative and operational matters. Security issues should be handled exclusively by specialized professionals who possess the necessary expertise and resources.

A major problem for security and a significant boon to crime is the struggle by educational institutions to maintain their reputation and positive statistics. This compels their leadership to use any means necessary to conceal committed offenses from official record-keeping and full investigation until these incidents begin to lead to serious consequences and it becomes impossible to conceal them any longer. In addition, it is not uncommon for employees of educational institutions to exploit their official positions to deliberately disregard safety requirements or interfere with the activities of security services, demanding that rules be disregarded in the interest of the educational process or other aspects of the institution’s operations.

The only effective way to address the situation is to strip the administrations of educational institutions and education officials of any leverage over security matters. Only this will allow us to lay a solid foundation upon which we can subsequently build a transparent and effective system with clearly defined responsibilities. Security will be provided by professionals, and educational institutions will be able to focus on their primary mission—the education and upbringing of the younger generation.

This raises the question: to whom, then, should these functions be transferred? The answer depends on the direction the authorities choose for the future development of the security system for educational institutions and places where large numbers of children gather.

If they opt for a separate specialized agency, as described in the draft comprehensive security system for educational institutions, then these tasks would be transferred to the Government Agency for Threat Prevention—which plans, coordinates, and sets objectives—and to the Specialized Police Service, which carries them out directly.

If everything remains in its current format, these tasks will have to be assigned to the National Police.

There is also the option of transferring this responsibility to private contractors; a similar system exists in some U.S. states.

 

5. Creating conditions for the development of human and professional resources.

Whichever system the Philippine authorities choose, they will need specialists—not «paper» ones, but real ones—who possess not just «impressive» diplomas, but genuine knowledge and skills. Establishing specialized training centers to educate professionals in the fields of security and psychology, using curricula developed based on domestic expertise and best international practices. Enabling professionals to participate in international training and exchange programs. Membership in international professional communities focused on school safety, or the creation of such communities.

All of this will make it possible, within a few years, to establish a solid scientific and practical foundation upon which to build a comprehensive, multi-level security system based on any of the possible models.

 

Conclusion.

As of today, the Philippines is in the early stages of establishing a national system to ensure the security of schools and other educational institutions. The country’s authorities have acknowledged the very existence of the threat, the extent of its danger, and the possible future consequences if it is ignored. Representatives of the legislative and executive branches have expressed a clear interest in jointly developing strategies to counter this threat, and substantial funds have been allocated for their implementation.

It is important that resources and efforts be directed appropriately and that these initiatives do not devolve into populism. I will reiterate: there are no quick-fix solutions here; it will take years of serious work and substantial financial investment. However, the result will be an effective and reliable security system capable of ensuring the robust protection of educational facilities against both current and future threats.

The Philippines is neither the first nor the last such case. This is a test of the state’s ability not to sweep its mistakes under the rug, but to learn from them. And this test can be passed if we start by taking the right steps.

 

Author: Roman Grishin

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Online Extremist Communities and Mass Killings at Schools and Other Educational Institutions. Part 3.

 

Continued: Previous posts: Part 1, Part 2.

The implementation of additional monitoring measures and both overt and covert interventions targeting adolescents in potential at-risk groups* within educational and childcare institutions. This should have a significant impact on the total number of potential victims of «Death Group» recruiters and, consequently, on the number of perpetrators of crimes committed at the direction of and in the interests of these groups. As a result: a reduction in the activity of such groups, a slowdown in the spread of the extremist ideas they promote, and, most importantly, a decrease in the number of serious and particularly serious crimes committed by their members in countries where this work is actually carried out.

If this approach is integrated into the work of psychologists and sociologists at educational and other children’s institutions on a permanent basis, Maintaining the work of an international monitoring and coordination group - which will track changes in the situation and adjust detection and countermeasures accordingly- will serve as an effective deterrent to the threat and, in the long term, help bring the situation under control.

As an effective complement to the aforementioned deterrence measures- one that reduces the number of potential victims for recruiters - I would suggest that the leadership of schools, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children and adolescents gather consider implementing an approach such as CPTED.

 CPTED: The concept of «Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design» (CPTED) is an approach aimed at reducing crime by altering the physical environment in which it occurs. The core of the concept is that a well-designed physical space can prevent crime, deter undesirable behavior, and strengthen community ties.

 The effectiveness of this method in reducing violence in educational institutions has been confirmed by many years of practical research conducted by Safe Havens International (SHI) - one of the world’s oldest and most experienced expert and analytical organizations specializing in improving safety in educational institutions.

For more details on CPTED implementation methods and the results achieved, see the articles by SHI Executive Director Michael Dorn, a recognized international expert in the field of school safety and security.

Although creating a more comfortable psychological and emotional environment does not solve all security problems and does not have a guaranteed effect on all at-risk adolescents, according to research findings, the use of such methods can reduce anxiety, stress, and aggression among some adolescents by 10–15 percent, thereby reducing the number of potential victims. And the fewer such emotionally and psychologically vulnerable adolescents there are, the more difficult it will be for recruiters from «death groups» to attract and control them.

It’s simple math. Today, «curators» from extremist communities recruit hundreds and thousands of teenagers through their online platforms, but at best, only dozens agree to participate in active operations, and only a handful commit particularly serious crimes. By reducing the initial number, we will reduce the rest as well. Even a 10–15% reduction would be a good result here.

The next aspect of the threat containment phase is blocking the online resources used by criminals. It is important to understand that this aspect is extremely complex, both technically and legally. Blocking must be precise and targeted, focusing on specific communities and individual accounts through which extremist material is disseminated and teenagers are recruited to engage in criminal and terrorist activities.

In this situation, criminals exploit several existing vulnerabilities. I have identified five main problems that we face:

1.    The difficulty of blocking individual accounts on social media and messaging apps.

Using technical and software-based blocking tools, it is practically impossible to restrict access to one (or more) individual accounts without the involvement of the social media or messaging app administration.

2. The complexity and length of the legal and administrative procedures required to obtain court orders to block such websites, as well as individual profiles and communities.

As a follow-up to point 1: The administrators of social media platforms and messaging apps generally recognize the threat, but—in accordance with their internal policies, as well as national and international legal instruments on freedom of speech and information - they require law enforcement agencies to provide evidence and, often, court orders to block accounts. Obtaining such a ruling is not easy, and often takes a long time—sometimes weeks or months - while law enforcement officials gather the evidence needed to present to the court.

3. Jurisdiction.

As I mentioned in Parts 1 and 2, this threat is international in nature. In recent years, extremists have most often used a scheme in which the recruiter is located in one country and his victims in another. In doing so, the perpetrator often chooses countries that have diplomatic disputes and where cooperation between law enforcement agencies is virtually nonexistent. Court rulings in one country carry no weight in another.

4. Procedural Differences.

Different countries have different criminal laws, and different types of crimes have different qualifying characteristics, types (categories), nature, and severity. What is considered a particularly serious crime in one country may be regarded as an administrative offense in another. Under the law of one country, certain types of items, methods of recording, and procedures for seizing information are considered evidence in court, while in another they are not.

5. Differences in procedural documentation.

Different countries have different types, forms, and methods for preparing procedural documents, as well as different methods for recording and documenting evidence, questioning suspects and witnesses, and obtaining and admitting evidence into the case file. Evidence gathered in one country will not be accepted by a court in another country simply because it was not properly documented, due to differing procedural approaches to documenting facts of procedural significance.

All of this complicates the work of law enforcement officers and makes it easier for criminals and criminal organizations to operate. On the other hand, however, it is also unacceptable to simplify the procedure for blocking accounts by reducing the number and quality of the legal grounds for doing so. This would provide grounds both for unfounded and unsubstantiated restrictions on the dissemination of information based solely on suspicion, and for deliberate abuse of power. This cannot be allowed; the rule of law is a fundamental principle and must be strictly observed.

But how, then, can we ensure both prompt action and strict adherence to the rule of law? Is such a compromise even possible? Yes, it is possible, but it will require fundamental changes to the current approach.

Currently, sending an international request (even between countries that have agreements in place) takes weeks or months; during that time, hundreds, if not thousands, of teenagers could be drawn into criminal networks, and dozens of serious crimes could be committed. We need a system for rapid procedural response at the international level. This system would allow law enforcement officers from any participating country to promptly obtain an enforceable procedural document, on the basis of which social media and messaging app administrators would block groups and users.

To implement this proposal in practice, several conditions must be met:

1. Establish an international judicial body with a highly specialized mandate, handling only one category of cases**. It need not necessarily be established specifically as a court; in the initial stage, it could be an international organization with judicial functions that operates in a judicial format but is not a court in the legal sense.

2. Develop a uniform international format for presenting charges and evidence for consideration by this judicial body. This document must contain clear definitions of:

- who has the right to file a case with this judicial body;

- what charges may be filed and on what grounds;

- what type of petition must be submitted and how it must be drafted;

- what evidence must be submitted, in what form, and how it must be obtained;

- within what timeframe the request must be reviewed;

- what decisions the judicial body may render.

3. Encourage - on the basis of international treaties - not all, but at least the largest international corporations that own the most widely used social media platforms, messaging apps, and other information resources exploited for criminal purposes to cooperate with this organization. The essence of this cooperation lies in the adoption and enforcement of decisions issued by this judicial body to block (or impose other restrictive measures on) the activities of accounts, users, or communities for which there are sufficient grounds to suspect involvement in extremist, terrorist, or other activities related to the commission of, or the involvement of other persons (primarily minors) in, particularly serious crimes directed against the person, life, or health of individuals.

The international judicial body referred to in paragraph 1 need not necessarily be established as a separate entity under international law; given its limited functions and legal authority, it may well be established as a structural unit of one of the existing international organizations with special legal status - such as the United Nations, for example. Funding will be provided by the participating countries under a separate international treaty. Each participating country will have the right to bring cases before this judicial body within the scope of its jurisdiction and will undertake to pay membership dues for its maintenance and to enforce its decisions within its territory. For example, by equating a decision of this international judicial body - insofar as it pertains to restrictions on the dissemination of information - with a decision of a court within that state’s judicial system in terms of procedural status.

The judicial body itself will not be overly large in terms of organizational structure or staffing. The review of requests and the rendering of decisions will be a collegial process; in my opinion, the panel should consist of three judges who receive, review, consider, and render a decision on each submitted request within 60 hours. In certain emergency situations, this should be done within 12 hours. The credibility of the charges and the persuasiveness of the evidence will be assessed in light of generally accepted norms of national and international law. Accordingly, the judges must possess relevant knowledge of international law and sufficient practical experience in its application.

On average, each panel will be able to review up to 4 requests per week. Under current circumstances, the average caseload will be approximately 100 requests per month. I would like to remind you that this body will consider only a small fraction of crimes in the field of information security. These are direct, explicit threats of an extremist, terrorist, or other nature related to the commission of - or the involvement of others (primarily minors) in - particularly serious crimes directed against the person, life, or health of individuals. There are not many such crimes at present, but they fall into the category of the most socially dangerous, which is why they require the swiftest possible enforcement measures.

Based on preliminary figures, the total authorized staff of such a judicial body - including not only judges but also administrative and technical personnel - will number approximately 200 employees. For an international organization, this is not a large number; with at least 30 participating countries, funding would not be costly.

The main challenge will be convincing large international corporations - which own the most major social media platforms, messaging apps, and other information resources, most of which are used for criminal purposes - of the need for cooperation. Only then will it be possible to realize the key advantage of such a system: speed of response.

Promptly blocking communication channels and the dissemination of extremist material will significantly curtail the capabilities of destructive communities and, most importantly, hinder - and in some cases even dismantle - the system used to manage and coordinate illegal activities. This is particularly relevant now, as teenagers are increasingly being actively recruited to organize mass riots. I wrote about this as far back as 2023, when mass brawls and pogroms carried out by groups of teenagers from the «PMC Ryodan» subculture were reported in Russia and several neighboring countries. At the time, I suggested that these events were not random and that what we were witnessing were not spontaneous incidents, but rather planned and orchestrated processes. We can see a similar situation today in the U.S., where a wave of such crimes is underway, and they have even been given their own name: «Teen Takeover». Similar mass attacks, albeit on a smaller scale, have also been reported in Europe.

As an analysis of the incidents revealed, calls to commit illegal acts, information about meeting places, and the identification of targets, times, and locations of the attacks were carried out through social media communities, chat rooms, and messaging apps.

In conclusion to Part 3, I would like to remind you that the threat posed by «death groups» and other destructive online communities has long since become an international one. Advances in information technology and new forms and methods of communication have erased the boundaries between countries and continents. Unfortunately, criminals and extremists are actively exploiting this, and their communities have quickly become transnational. Under such conditions, a decentralized security system - where everyone is on their own - has become ineffective. We can only counter these threats by working together, consolidating our efforts on an international level, and taking a proactive, preemptive, and anticipatory approach. In this case, we have every chance of winning this battle for a safe future for our children.

In the next article, I will continue to share my proposals on countering the activities of «death groups». This will mark the conclusion of Phase 2, which is dedicated to developing effective practical solutions - the implementation of which will hinder the spread of information and recruitment, thereby reducing the influx of new recruits into extremist communities - and the transition to Phase 3, which focuses on specific tactical countermeasures.

* the psychotype of the members of this group, as well as the methods for identifying and influencing it, will be developed jointly by behavioral analysis specialists, based on the processing of personal data collected during the international group’s work. Further details are provided in Part 2.

** at the initial stage. However, given the growth and evolution of transnational threats in the field of information technology, the establishment of such a judicial body holds significant promise for future development, with its jurisdiction expanding to cover other categories of crimes.

Author: Roman Grishin

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