Project Review: Agreement, Disagreement, and Arguments

 

I recently received a review of my project to develop a school security system. It was written by one of the most reputable and authoritative international organizations in this field.

I won’t mention the organization’s name for two reasons:

1. I didn’t receive permission from its authors to do so;

2. so that this wouldn’t be seen as hidden advertising.

The review is critical but constructive. I respect the criticism and have decided not only to take it into account but also to address each point publicly—with respect for my opponents, but with clear counterarguments. Here’s what came of it:

Quote from the review: 1. When it comes to school safety, we must take into account the serious budget and staffing constraints that educational institutions face. The excessively high number of security personnel, technology, and so on that you propose is simply unrealistic even for the best-funded schools in the wealthiest countries, such as the United States.

My comment: I completely agree that the measures I’m proposing are expensive, but it’s worth asking: Can an effective security system for a facility where large numbers of people from a particularly vulnerable group gather - children and teenagers, who, due to their young age and lack of life experience, fall into this very category - really be cheap? I think the answer is obvious: it’s impossible in principle. Cheap security measures often do more harm than good, because parents believe their child is safe and protected at school, but when a dangerous incident occurs, the security system either fails to function as it should or doesn’t work at all. In general, any half-measures in the area of safety are like installing a gate without a fence, or putting an expensive, reliable lock on a door made of cardboard. Formally, they’re there, but in reality, they’re useless.

The issue of funding depends on the approach taken to address it. Let me clarify right away that I may be mistaken in some of my conclusions; I have based my analysis on information from open sources, as well as on reports from analytical agencies regarding crimes committed in U.S. educational institutions. Currently, most U.S. schools handle their own security independently. Schools operate autonomously when it comes to acquiring and using security equipment, developing regulations and protocols, and hiring security personnel and officials responsible for security matters. Local law enforcement agencies provide immediate response in emergency situations and are indirectly involved in the prevention of crimes and incidents. Municipal education departments—and in some cases, state-level departments (offices, bureaus, etc.) - are responsible for the safety of educational facilities. Additionally, there are individual officials, and in some cases, teams or units within police and fire departments that oversee these matters. All of these individuals need to be trained, and periodic additional training and professional development should be provided. There are also various municipal councils, inter-school councils, and other officials, administrative services, and community groups. There are various targeted programs aimed at improving safety, funded through the budget or grants, and much more. Simply put, there is money available in this area—and quite a lot of it - but the question is whether it is appropriate and effective to use it. Incidentally, the system in Russia is largely similar.

My proposal, as outlined in the draft, is to centralize these processes and consolidate tasks, functions, and funding into a single system. The first step in this process is to completely relieve school administrations of responsibility for the safety of educational institutions. Let school leadership, along with teaching and administrative staff, focus on education, student development, and extracurricular activities; safety should be handled by professionals. In this case, the school would allocate all available funds from its budget line items for security and safety, crime prevention, and accident prevention at educational facilities - as well as other expenses directly or indirectly related to this area—to a single specialized police service. This service ensures comprehensive security for the educational facility, both on and off school grounds, ranging from prevention to the elimination of direct threats. Equally important is the fact that this service bears full responsibility for this area of work. This service is established as a specialized unit but is part of the existing municipal police force, which significantly reduces the cost of its establishment and operations. More details about this service, its objectives, and capabilities can be found in the draft proposal.

It seems to me that the main problem here is not a lack of funds, but rather how wisely they are spent.

Quote from the review: 2. Furthermore, it is very important to realize that in the United States and most developed countries, the number of deaths from violence is significantly lower than the number of deaths from other causes, such as non-violence-related medical emergencies, children being struck by cars and school buses, etc. Although acts of violence resulting in mass casualties receive extensive media coverage, they are among the rarest causes of death in schools in the U.S., Canada, the United Kingdom, and, in my experience, in developing countries.  I am almost certain that if you had reliable data for Russia, the situation there would be the same or similar.  It is very important that the budgets and personnel allocated to security measures do not lead to an increase in the number of deaths because these risks are being overlooked — every year we face preventable fatalities because schools spend too much on measures to counter active shooters, while ignoring the dangers that claim the lives of far more students and staff.

My comment: I fully agree that the number of victims of mass killings and terrorist attacks in educational institutions in most countries’ accounts for less than 5% of the total number of deaths, injuries, and victims of other types of crimes. It’s just that these incidents receive less media and public attention. In Section «III. Proposed Solution», I listed the risks and threats that the implementation of the security measures specified in the project should significantly mitigate. These include:

1. Criminal and terrorist threats:

Property crimes:

- theft (of both personal properties belonging to students and staff and property belonging to the educational institution);

- extortion;

- robbery;

- armed robbery;

- fraud;

- intentional damage to or destruction of property (including both the personal property of students and staff and the property of the educational institution).

2. Crimes against the person (against both students and employees):

- assault;

- causing bodily harm of varying degrees of severity;

- insults;

- threats of murder or physical violence;

- sexual harassment, lewd acts;

- rape;

- defamation;

- stalking;

- bullying.

3. Crimes against public order and security:

- the formation and operation of organized criminal groups (gangs);

- the formation and operation of organized extremist groups;

- the dissemination of extremist ideology;

- involvement in criminal activity;

- involvement in extremist activity;

- involvement in groups and organizations whose activities are prohibited;

- hooliganism;

- illicit trafficking in weapons, ammunition, and explosives;

- terrorism.

4. Crimes against public health:

- illicit drug trafficking;

- illicit trafficking in potent or toxic substances.

5. Non-criminal threats:

- traffic accidents;

- fires;

- dangerous animals;

- other natural or man-made emergencies that pose a direct threat to the life, health, or property of students, staff, or the educational institution.

At the same time, these same cases of mass killings are often the inevitable consequences of other crimes that preceded them - crimes that had been committed with impunity on school grounds over a long period of time. It is unpleasant to admit, but it is a fact that very often security personnel, teachers, and administrative staff at educational institutions are aware of threats, bullying, harassment, and other crimes taking place on campus, as well as the existence of informal extremist or criminal groups. They know, but they remain silent and do not intervene; the reasons vary - from fear and reluctance to get involved to a sense of powerlessness - and often these are deliberate actions by school leadership, an attempt to preserve the institution’s «reputation» and avoid negatively impacting its statistics. The solutions proposed as part of the project are designed to change this - to shift from passive observation to active intervention, threat forecasting, prevention, and early detection and suppression. The system is built on the principle of multifunctionality; it is designed to ensure children’s safety at all stages and against threats of any nature (including natural and man-made ones), from the moment they leave home for school until they return.

Quote from the review: 3. It is important to analyze the cost-benefit ratio of measures designed to protect human life. In other words, how likely is it that a particular measure will prevent serious injury or death, given the costs involved, and where, from a statistical standpoint, could these resources be better allocated.

My comment: I completely agree; a rational and balanced approach is at the core of this project. It is impossible to calculate all possible scenarios and risks purely hypothetically - practical testing is necessary. That is precisely why the concluding section of the project states that the proposed system has not been tested under real-world conditions, and therefore its practical effectiveness has not yet been proven. In any case, it cannot be implemented immediately and across the board; first, an experiment is needed - a practical test of its functionality under real-world conditions - over the course of several years in a single region or in several cities across different regions. Testing under real-world conditions will inevitably reveal certain shortcomings and oversights; this is a normal part of the process for anything new. In just a few years, taking into account the corrections made to errors and shortcomings identified during the experiment, as well as the additions and improvements made, this will be a completely different model. The effectiveness and functionality of each of its components will be verified and proven in practice through repeated testing and verification under various conditions and scenarios. It will be a template that can be used worldwide, with minor adjustments for local characteristics, but the foundation will remain the same—one that, drawing on international experience, will only become better and more reliable year after year.

Quote from the review: 4. We have several peer-reviewed studies conducted in the United States that show that school climate and culture, as well as student supervision, are among the most effective measures for preventing homicides, while the effectiveness of measures such as metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and the like has not been confirmed. As one example, see the 2016 Rand Corporation report on school security technologies.  Although it is important to note that school surveillance technology has advanced significantly since then, we know that we must be careful not to create a prison-like atmosphere, as this could actually increase the likelihood of school shootings.

My comment: I do not deny that creating a supportive and comfortable moral and psychological environment, maintaining a high cultural standard, and providing quality supervision of students are effective measures for preventing crime among students. The proposed bill does not hinder the implementation and use of measures aimed at fostering a positive environment, culture, and supervision in educational institutions; all of these can coexist without interfering with one another. They simply serve different purposes. Technical security and monitoring measures are effective when applied correctly. I have read the 2016 Rand Corporation study and fully agree that, at the time of publication, the use of metal detectors, surveillance cameras, and other such devices had not demonstrated particular effectiveness; I would add that even now, 10 years later, the situation has not improved. Technology has advanced significantly, yet the effectiveness of its use has remained at the same level. The reason is that, in most cases, these measures are used haphazardly. One of the project’s most important objectives is to address this very problem: to integrate individual technical security measures into a single automated security system (section: «III. Proposed Solution»; subsection: «4. Technical Security Measures»; section «Multifunctional Software and Hardware Complex»). This will greatly increase their capabilities and effectiveness, transforming them into an effective tool for preventing and suppressing offenses.

Quote from the review: 5. I am skeptical of some of the technologies you propose, as I do not believe they are reliable enough to justify the associated costs.  I served as an expert witness in a U.S. Federal Trade Commission investigation into false advertising claims by companies manufacturing AI-powered weapon detectors, and these devices absolutely do not do what the manufacturers promised - and still do not.  For example, they fail to detect 9mm micro-pistols in about 45% of cases - not to mention situations where security personnel are not paying attention, and without taking into account attempts to bypass security checkpoints - 9mm micro-pistols currently account for about 25% of all pistol sales in the U.S. - my carry pistol holds 13 rounds, and I have yet to visit a single facility where they are used where I wasn’t confident I could bring it into the secured area. Furthermore, having worked with the seven largest public school systems in the country and many modern, medium-sized school districts (each with 100,000 students), I have come to the conclusion that attempting to implement too many high-tech systems leads to serious disruptions, since people are unable to manage that much technology — we face the same problems in casinos, where huge sums are invested in security technology and personnel, yet on any given day, between 20 and 205 surveillance cameras can be taken out of service—even though their budgets far exceed that of a school district. When drawing up a budget, it is essential to account for the costs of the entire IT staff—not only for installation but also for ensuring the smooth operation of systems, updates, cybersecurity, and so on.  This often results in very large budget allocations.  Another important factor is the existing infrastructure.  Many large, open-plan buildings in Florida and California lack modern infrastructure, so running electrical wiring and fiber-optic cable for each camera, access control device, sensor, etc., can cost $3,000—and this is often the case.  For example, in one project we completed in 2018, installing a single $300 surveillance camera cost $3,000.

My comment: I fully understand the expert’s skepticism; in fact, at first, I myself was very skeptical of AI-based security technology. But technology is advancing, and the solutions being offered are becoming increasingly effective. I had the opportunity to personally observe a modern X-ray scanner used by transportation security personnel, where the signal is processed not only by the operator but also by AI. Currently, this system is capable of recognizing and identifying not only the gun itself but also its individual components in approximately 95% of cases. Importantly - especially given its priceм - the device itself has significant potential for upgrades; it does not require replacement of the unit or its individual parts (except for routine maintenance) - updating and enhancing its software is sufficient.

Every year, technology becomes higher quality, more accessible, and less expensive; the number of communication methods, wireless connectivity options, and remote control capabilities increases; and the speed and bandwidth of communication channels grow. Connecting and replacing equipment is becoming easier, faster, and less expensive. The project does not call for the installation of particularly expensive equipment (except for introscopes); everything else falls within the mid-range price segment, offers a high level of reliability and energy efficiency (low power consumption), and some components - such as pressure-sensitive sensors - are among the simplest, cheapest, and most reliable available. But as I mentioned earlier in Answer No. 4, the technology itself is not what matters most; what matters is exactly how it is used. In this regard, I would like to highlight another key principle of the project: technology should complement and enhance human capabilities, not replace them.

Quote from the review: 6. As mentioned earlier, measures to identify problematic behavior and intervene are at least as effective—and, in my experience, often even more effective—than many school security technologies. Furthermore, they generally provide a much higher return on investment than many more expensive approaches, such as electronic weapon screening.

My comment: With all due respect to the expert’s qualifications, professional competence, and experience, I disagree with this statement. This is a one-sided approach; while it may be effective to some extent against internal threats, we must not forget that internal attacks account for only 52–54% of crimes committed in schools and other educational institutions. How can we counter them using these methods? A telling example is the attack on Covenant School in Nashville on March 27, 2023. According to a statement by Nashville Police Chief John Drake, published in «The Tennessean», the school was not the perpetrator’s original target. According to Drake, Hale had planned to attack another location, but it turned out to be too well-protected, so the perpetrator chose the school as a less secure target. If we focus all our efforts in only one direction, schools will become attractive, easy targets for mass murderers. This is especially true now that extremist groups such as «764», «NLM», «Red Dolphin», «Columbine», «Killer Cult Maniacs», and others like them have effectively declared schools, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children gather to be their targets. The first high-profile killings have already taken place. The question is, what can we do to counter them?

Let me reiterate: I do not deny that creating a supportive and comfortable moral and psychological environment, maintaining a high cultural standard, and providing quality supervision of students are effective measures for preventing crime among students. But if we rely solely on these measures, scenarios like the one at Covenant School will recur regularly.

 

In conclusion, I would like to sincerely thank the experts for taking the time and making the effort to provide such detailed and honest feedback. I greatly value your experience, as well as your objectivity and candor in your assessments and conclusions.

I am grateful for your specific comments; I will definitely take them into account as I refine the project, but overall, I will continue to move toward a systemic approach, which I consider the most promising.

Our perspectives do indeed stem from different paradigms: you view schools as autonomous entities, while I view them as elements of a single, managed system. I do not believe that either approach is absolutely right or wrong - they both solve the same problem, just in different ways. Time will tell which one is more effective.

However, I would like to say that I fully understand that there are currently many administrative, financial, and legal challenges, and that making the necessary changes to the system is difficult—and in some cases, impossible. So perhaps we shouldn’t get bogged down in discussions of existing barriers, but rather acknowledge that the current system is outdated and requires serious modernization, taking into account current and future threats that it is unable to address. Criminals and terrorists face no bureaucratic obstacles; they refine their methods much faster than we do, and we have already fallen seriously behind them—a gap that continues to widen, and it is certainly not in our favor. The question is which strategy to choose: to look for excuses for inaction or to start looking for ways to stay one step ahead.

Author: Roman Grishin

#review #expert #school #safety #schoolsafety #school_safety #security #K12 #opinion #position #comment #response #project #system #criticism #proposal #evaluation #threat #terrorism #crime

The “Public Order and Safety” portal now has a Telegram channel

 

Dear colleagues and readers!
Today, August 1, 2026, our Telegram channel has been created and launched.
This is the official channel of the international portal «Public Order and Safety».
This community is designed to bring together and facilitate communication among people who are involved in or interested in applied criminology, issues of public order and security, and the prevention and counteraction of crime and terrorism.
This is not a place for those who are only interested in discussing problems and assigning blame, or for those who talk about politics and conspiracy theories. 
This is a place only for those who:
- study existing and potential threats;
- seek and propose practical solutions for identifying, preventing, and countering these threats.
We invite you to join the conversation and discussion.
We’d especially appreciate it if you’d share this link in relevant communities.
Sincerely,

the Editor-in-Chief.

Online Extremist Communities and Mass Killings at Schools and Other Educational Institutions. Continued, Part 2.

 

As I mentioned in the first part of this article, the threat posed by online extremist communities is serious and real—there is no longer any doubt about that. I would like to add that in the last month alone, law enforcement agencies have suggested that these communities may have been involved in three more attacks:

June 22, 2026, Tacloban, Philippines;

July 6, 2026, Banting, Malaysia;

July 8, 2026, Schongau, Germany.

Politicians and officials have now acknowledged the very existence of this threat and are demanding that police forces take urgent countermeasures. However, there is no longer a quick and effective solution to this problem. Such an opportunity existed several years ago, when these groups began shifting their ideology, moving from extortion and fraud to organizing mass killings and riots. However, the threat was underestimated at the time, and now the opportunity has been missed.

Under the current circumstances, a completely different approach is needed—not an illusory plan designed for a quick «wow effect», but a strategy, a system designed not only to contain the threat in its current form but also to address the directions and forms of its possible development.

To build such a countermeasure system, I propose using the «Hostile Environment» model. What is this? Imagine crime not as a social phenomenon, but as a living organism. This organism actively grows, develops, and reproduces only if the environment is favorable. In such an environment, there are comfortable weather conditions, sufficient water and food, and no (or minimal) threats in the form of predators or natural disasters. In this case, the population of this species will grow and expand into more and more new territories.

The conclusion is simple: since crime is on the rise, it means the environment is favorable for it, and it is thriving. What should be done? We must develop a counterstrategy designed to make the environment for crime no longer comfortable, but rather hostile and aggressive—one in which the chances of survival are very slim.

 

Step 1: Gathering Information.

This is always the place to start; it is important to understand who you are dealing with, what their goals are, how they operate, and what capabilities they possess. Having as much reliable and objective information as possible about the adversary is half the battle. Their logic becomes clear and their actions become understandable, which means they become predictable—their next moves can be anticipated and thwarted.

The starting point is the testimony provided by surviving suspects in crimes committed in the interests of and at the behest of online extremist communities. They are direct participants who went through the entire chain of events, from recruitment to carrying out the final mission. They know a great deal; the question is, will they be willing to share this information? It is important to understand that, after consulting with their lawyers and parents, they will try to portray themselves as victims who acted unintentionally, under duress, or under threat of physical harm or the public disclosure of compromising material. Only 30–40% of the information in such accounts, which they provided during the investigation, will be reliable. All of them have been punished—some with actual prison terms, others, due to their age, with suspended sentences and restrictive measures. I believe it is acceptable, once the court decisions have taken effect, to offer them the opportunity to testify again, provided that the terms of their punishment are mitigated (within reasonable limits) and their anonymity is guaranteed. This would take place without procedural status, with the involvement of experts in psychology and forensic psychiatry.

The second, equally important area—which should proceed in parallel with the first—is the search for would-be perpetrators who did not carry out the crimes. Those who were also recruited and trained but did not go through with the crime, those who refused at the last moment, and those who were stopped during the preparation stage. This should be done anonymously, also without procedural status, with the involvement of specialists.

It is important to understand exactly how, where, and based on what criteria criminals find their victims—the principle behind selecting targets for potential recruitment. How did they come into contact with the handler of the extremist network? Did they seek out the meeting themselves, or did the recruiters approach them? Next, we need information on how potential victims are subjected to psychological manipulation. The details here are crucial; I am certain that recruiters do not immediately reveal to those they are recruiting their affiliation with extremist organizations and movements, nor do they disclose their objectives regarding these teenagers. This is the main question for the experts. I don’t think that on the other side, each teenager is assigned a professional psychologist or a recruiter with practical experience in foreign intelligence. They likely use people who have undergone some training, but only at the level of crash courses. They operate according to a specific template similar to aggressive online sales tactics; online scammers also use similar tactics.

Based on the limited information that has become publicly available, the recruitment system used by extremist communities closely resembles the one used by ISIS recruiters.

Hypothesis: Based on an analysis of the available information, they operate in a targeted and deliberate manner, using pre-compiled lists of potential victims—teenagers who are in a state of emotional and psychological vulnerability and are easily influenced and manipulated. They obtain these lists through legal and semi-legal means, ordering them through front companies from information and analytics agencies that collect data on target audiences for companies selling goods and services on social media. In this case, they may disguise their actual interest in the specified target audience as a search for potential customers for personal development courses, psychological services, dating sites, merchandise for informal communities, and so on. But in the near future (or perhaps even now), this will no longer be necessary, as specialized  AI-based search programs will be able to collect and perform the initial processing of such data.

The third area involves working with digital traces and analyzing the content of deleted groups, channels, websites, and other online communities. When courts or authorized regulatory bodies (which vary by country) block harmful communities, their content often simply disappears, resulting in the loss of valuable information for analysis. An operational protocol is needed for telecommunications operators and hosting providers, stipulating that, prior to blocking, all metadata (posts, comments, hashtags, timestamps, participants, etc.) must be preserved and transferred to a specialized law enforcement unit (more on this later) for subsequent analysis. This is like a «digital autopsy» for experts; it can yield a great deal of useful information, both for operational intelligence and as evidence in legal proceedings.

It is necessary to gather as much information as possible on the scenarios used by extremists, including details and a detailed algorithm of actions for locating, approaching, and manipulating victims. All of this should be provided to specialists—criminologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists—for analysis. Based on their conclusions, it will be possible to understand:

- the principles of locating and selecting victims;

- the sources of information used and the methods of gathering it;

- the scenarios and templates used in manipulating victims;

- methods of moral and psychological pressure;

- means of communication and other tools for controlling victims.

Expected outcome of this phase:

Using the collected data, it will be possible to develop a statistical model of a potential victim: age, gender, family characteristics (two-parent family or single-parent household, social status, income level, religious affiliation, parenting principles, and parental involvement in the child’s life, etc.), level of intellectual and physical development, attitudes toward school, politics, religion, sports, culture, hobbies, a moral and psychological profile, and other additional information.

The resulting model will make it possible to identify and provide a clear description of the most vulnerable groups of adolescents. This information must be forwarded to schools, colleges, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children gather. It is intended for practical use by teachers, psychologists, social workers, and staff of relevant police units.

Identifying a well-founded «risk group» of potential victims, placing them under observation, and notifying their parents (or guardians) of the potential threat is the first and most effective preventive measure, which will significantly reduce the effectiveness of extremist recruiters. It will serve as an effective deterrent and significantly slow the spread of the threat.

Key Features of Organizing This Phase:

To ensure the most effective and comprehensive collection of information, this process must be organized on an international scale.

An international information and analysis group is needed, comprising expert analysts and specialists from various countries—primarily those that have already suffered from the actions of criminals in online «death groups»*.

If each country collects information separately, without combining it with data from others, an effective statistical model will not be possible. All analysis will be based on very sparse and incomplete data. As a result, instead of an effective tool for deterring the threat, we will end up with a general template containing vague wording and generic phrases, which is of little practical use. To be frank, this is exactly what we have today. Let me remind you: we are dealing with an international threat that operates according to this pattern: the organizer is in one country, the recruiter in another, the handler in a third, and the final perpetrators in a fourth. Trying to counter them on an «every man for himself» basis won’t work—we’ll lose, yet again. The more information we can gather and process, the more accurate and detailed the experts’ conclusions will be.   Therefore, we must act together; only this will guarantee a positive outcome.

On a personal note: I want to appeal once again to my colleagues—it’s time to put an end to political squabbles and return to being professionals. When it comes to children’s safety, there is no room for disagreements over contrived issues. As you can see, criminals do not distinguish between «good» and «bad» children; they maim and kill everyone, regardless of citizenship, race, religion, or political affiliation.

In my next article, I will continue to share my proposals on countering the activities of «death groups»*. This will be Phase 2, which is dedicated to developing effective practical solutions whose implementation will make it more difficult to spread information and recruit new members, thereby reducing the influx of new operatives into extremist communities.

* This term was coined by journalists who have written about extremist and destructive online communities. I will use this term here and in the future to refer to communities on social media and messaging apps that promote violence and encourage teenagers to commit suicide, mass murder, and other serious crimes.

Author – Roman Grishin.

#schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #K-12 #massshooting #764 #reddolphin #bluewhale #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #article #threat

Safety in Schools and Other Educational Institutions: An Overview of the Current Global Situation, First Half of 2026.

 
The first half of 2026 has come to a close, so it’s time to take stock and draw some preliminary conclusions. The first conclusion is that my forecast, made based on the results of 2025 and published in an article, did not come true. At that time, I predicted that in 2026 there would be a 25–30% decrease in the number of crimes committed, based on key indicators. I reached this conclusion by comparing the sharp spike in crime rates in 2025 with a similar spike in 2014, after which the figures for the following several years were even slightly below average. Based on this comparison, I concluded that in 2014 and 2025, there was a sort of «release of accumulated excess pressure», followed by several years of relative «calm» and then another rise to a new record high. The forecast did not materialize.

The situation in the first half of 2026 became much more complicated, with growth across virtually all indicators.

 

Statistics for the first 6 months, a brief overview:

In total, 72 serious and particularly serious crimes were committed in schools and other educational institutions, which is 35.8% more than during the same period last year (hereinafter referred to as «s.p.l.y.») - 53.

There were 43 crimes involving mass murder and acts of terrorism; during the same period last year, there were 22 such crimes, representing an increase of nearly double, or 95.4%. Below are the specific figures for this category of crimes.

The proportion of crimes committed with firearms decreased slightly to 41.8% (s.p.l.y. - 45.5%), however, the proportion of crimes committed using chemical poisons rose significantly to 11.6% (s.p.l.y. - 4.5%), incendiary devices and mixtures to 9.3% (s.p.l.y. - 4.5%), and explosive devices 4.6% (s.p.l.y. - 0%). The proportion of attacks committed by groups rose slightly to 9.3% (s.p.l.y. - 9.1%), as did that of terrorist attacks 2.3%( s.p.l.y. - 0%).

The percentage of crimes in which vehicles were used as weapons decreased significantly to 0% (s.p.l.y. - 9.1%), and the percentage of crimes in which the perpetrators managed to flee the scene was halved to 18.6% (s.p.l.y. - 36.3%).

Total number of victims (under Section 2, «Crimes with characteristics of mass murders and terrorist acts2): 218 (s.p.l.y. - 143), of whom:

- 46 were killed (s.p.l.y. - 39);

- 172 were injured (s.p.l.y. - 104).

Despite the increase in these figures, the public danger coefficient for attacks in the first half of 2026 decreased to 3.06; in the same period of 2025, it was 4.1.

 

Geography of Crime:

There have been sharp, negative changes in two countries: Turkey and the Philippines.

In Turkey, the situation deteriorated sharply in the spring. The first attack took place on March 2 at a school in Istanbul; a month and a half later, two attacks occurred one day apart: on April 14 in Siverek and the following day in Kahramanmaraş, resulting in 38 victims—10 dead and 28 wounded. In terms of scale, these crimes exceeded the figures for the previous 25 years. Prior to this, mass killings at educational institutions in Turkey had occurred twice: 

- November 22, 2005, in Nusaybin: an attack on a school, 5 victims (1 killed, 4 injured);

- April 5, 2018, in Ankara: an attack on a university, 7 victims (4 killed, 3 injured).

 

In the Philippines, events in June sent shockwaves through the country, with three consecutive attacks occurring within one week:

- June 16, 2026, General Trias, Philippines;

- June 19, 2026, Cavite, Philippines (stabbing, 1 injured, male, 18 years old, student);

- June 22, 2026, Tacloban, Philippines;

Two of the incidents showed signs of mass killings. There were 16 victims, including 3 fatalities and 13 injured.

Prior to this, over the past 25 years, there had been only one similar incident in the Philippines, on October 22, 2010, in Zamboanga; however, that was a single external attack on an elementary school carried out by a perpetrator over 50 years old. In 2026, the picture is completely different: one attack was carried out by a group, two were internal (carried out by students at these schools), and one was of a mixed nature; the oldest of the attackers was 18 years old.

It is still difficult to say exactly what caused such drastic changes in the situation, specifically in these two countries, where, until 2026, such crimes were the exception rather than the rule. There are several theories, but none of them is backed by direct evidence; for now, everything remains at the level of speculation, and more definitive conclusions can be drawn at the end of the year.

As for positive developments, the situation in China shows a positive trend. I’m not sure exactly what this is due to, but for the first half of 2026, there is not a single mention of China in open sources in the context of serious and particularly serious crimes committed in educational institutions. This is unusual, as China typically ranks among the top three countries in terms of the number of such attacks. By comparison, last year saw four crimes in China that met the criteria for mass murders and terrorist acts, two of which occurred in the first half of the year.

Otherwise, no other significant changes were recorded on the world map during the first half of 2026. However, the overall trend is that the list of countries where such crimes are committed is growing every year. As of today, based on statistics for the past six months, the geographic distribution of attacks on educational facilities is as follows: the United States, Russia, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Thailand, India, the Netherlands, Finland, Uganda, and Lithuania.

I won’t make any predictions for the end of the year, but so far everything indicates that the all-time high set in 2025 will most likely be surpassed this year.

Over the next one and a half to two months, we can expect a lull, as most educational institutions around the world close for summer break. It’s still hard to say what will happen in the fall, when the school year begins. There is a high probability that an already difficult situation could become even more complicated due to the growing activity of online extremist communities and movements, which have shifted to more aggressive tactics and ideologies and have begun actively promoting ideas of misanthropy - but that is a topic for a separate discussion. 

Author – Roman Grishin.

#2026 #statistics #overview #schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #massshooting #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #k-12 #threat

Online Extremist Communities and Mass Killings at Schools and Other Educational Institutions. Continued, Part 1.

 

Note: it should be borne in mind that the author lives and works in Russia, so in this article, he considers the situation on the example of his country. Measures to ensure the safety of schools, other educational institutions and places with a mass stay of children that he proposes are developed by him for use in Russia, taking into account the existing law enforcement system and the situation there.

In 2024, while researching cases of mass school shootings, I first came across information indicating that several such crimes had been committed by teenagers who were carrying out a «final task» assigned by the administrators of a closed social media group. This information was indirectly corroborated by statements from the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Chair of the «Safe Internet League» - the largest quasi-governmental organization in the field of digital security—as well as a major public organization providing assistance to minors in crisis situations. It was then that the name of this community - «Red Dolphin» - was first mentioned.

The emergence of communities and movements with similar ideologies and tactics was predictable. First, around 2015, a community called «Blue Whale» emerged, which, operating through social media and messaging apps, incited teenagers to commit suicide. In their activities, they employed a step-by-step scheme to lead the victim toward a planned outcome through the sequential completion of individual tasks modeled after a game-like quest. Even within the community itself, completing these tasks was referred to as «The Game,» with the victim’s profile featuring the hashtag #TheGame and similar tags. Each new «player» was assigned a mentor who gave tasks, monitored their completion, and provided psychological support to the victim until the final task—suicide, most often a jump from a height. There is no exact information in open sources regarding the number of victims officially confirmed. The figures cited in journalistic investigations are contradictory; some sources mention dozens of victims, while others cite hundreds. Regarding the organizers, there is information about only one criminal case—involving the organizer of such a social media community—which was investigated, concluded, sent to court, and resulted in a guilty verdict in 2025.  I am unaware of the motives, but the tactics used by «Blue Whale» were based on an individualized approach aimed at causing the death of a single, isolated person through their own actions.

As for «The Red Dolphin,» things were different here; the tactic was similar—based on the victim, who was being manipulated, carrying out the handler’s instructions—but the tasks here were entirely different. The initial tasks involved minor offenses, such as leaving graffiti on walls and doors or placing a sticker on a car or public transportation. Subsequent tasks became more complex and were classified as criminal offenses, including shoplifting, property damage, assaulting peers or younger children, arson, animal cruelty, and so on. The teenagers were not only required to commit these acts but also to document them with photos and videos and send them to the handler. In effect, they were collecting and handing over incriminating evidence against themselves to the «Game’s» handler. If a teenager tried to refuse to proceed and complete the tasks, blackmail, threats of violence from other «players,» and other forms of psychological pressure would begin. The «handlers» goal was the same—to drive the teenager to suicide—but through a different, more dangerous method. The teenager was first required to commit a mass murder and then take their own life.

This represents a new form of mass murder in educational institutions, with the planning and execution remotely controlled by third parties. Similar crimes have occurred before, but they were primarily mass murders committed in public places or targeting specific individuals or organizations. Recruiters for the terrorist organization ISIS often used this tactic of lone-wolf attacks: they would first identify people interested in their ideology on social media and messaging apps, then remotely indoctrinate them, turning them into committed fanatics. After the subject underwent psychological conditioning, they would receive a command from their handler to take a weapon—or an object used as a weapon—and go out onto the streets to kill people. There have been quite a few such cases, but the use of teenagers to attack schools and other children’s institutions has been virtually nonexistent. There have been terrorist attacks on educational institutions, but they followed a different scenario, and in most cases, the perpetrators were people over the age of 18.

However, I would surmise that the use of teenagers in particular—as the segment of society most susceptible to indoctrination and, at the same time, sufficiently aggressive and reckless—has piqued the interest of terrorist organizations and other extremist groups and movements. Their groups and organizations can be used to instigate mass unrest, while lone actors can be used to carry out mass killings in educational institutions. I first expressed these assumptions in March 2023, when I commented on the situation involving the «Ryodan PMC,» and then in October 2024, I published two more articles (Part 1 and Part 2) on this topic with additional arguments regarding the extremist group «Red Dolphin.»

Even then, I expressed the view that these were not isolated incidents and that we were dealing with a new tactic involving mass killings and the infliction of serious harm on the health of children and adolescents in schools and other educational institutions. I also stated there that, given the development of social media, messaging apps, and other forms of communication, this threat would quickly reach the international level. It appears that this is exactly what has happened.

In early June 2026, my colleagues from the U.S. sent me a link to a document—an open letter from the Dallas, Texas, field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to parents, guardians, and teachers. I won’t quote it in full here (those interested can read it for themselves by following the link), but the letter addresses the growing security threat posed by a malicious online network known as «764.» Their members often befriend minors on popular online gaming platforms and social media, gain their trust by posing as friends, and then coerce them into harming themselves or others. They operate worldwide, driven by hatred, sexual gratification, or a desire to sow chaos. Regardless of their motivation, they share a common goal: children and other vulnerable individuals. They exploit the trust they initially gained to manipulate their victims and force them to harm themselves or others. The FBI is currently investigating more than 450 individuals linked to these cruel online networks. The report also provides recommendations on how to monitor teenagers’ behavior and identify direct and indirect signs that a child may have become a victim of such manipulators. It includes links to additional educational resources and contact information for reporting incidents. The bureau reaffirms its commitment to combating this dangerous phenomenon. 

In short, the extremist online community «764» and several other groups associated with it operate primarily within the United States, but have large cells in Greece, the United Kingdom, France, Romania, Brazil, Sweden, Canada, Australia, Spain, and Turkey. Their main activities include sexual blackmail, the distribution of child pornography, and the recruitment of children to commit crimes. The pattern is similar: recruitment, indoctrination, and the commission of crimes under the supervision of handlers—either at the initiative of teenagers who share extremist views or under coercion.

Among the high-profile crimes committed in recent years by supporters of «764,» the following can be cited:

January 2025, Borås, Sweden: A 14-year-old criminal armed with a knife brutally stabbed an elderly woman to death. The attacker recorded the attack on video and personally uploaded the clip online via an account directly linked to and verified by the «764» community in order to report to the moderators;

August 2024, Eskişehir, Turkey: An 18-year-old criminal armed with a knife attacked random passersby near a local mosque; five people were injured. Before the attack, the assailant published his manifesto, to which he attached extremist manuals and Nazi literature actively circulated by «764» supporters;

April 2022, Mediaș, Romania: A 17-year-old assailant armed with a knife attacked an elderly woman, injuring her, and livestreamed the crime online. During the investigation, it was established that the perpetrator carried out this attack as an «initiation rite» to join the «764» group.

Some journalists also attribute to «764» the mass murder in Southport, United Kingdom, in July 2024, when a 17-year-old assailant armed with a knife attacked a children’s dance studio, killing 3 people and injuring 10 others. Despite the suspect’s interest in extremist ideology, his connection to «764» or similar groups has not been definitively established or confirmed.

Among the attacks carried out by «764» adherents on educational institutions, a link has been confirmed to the attack on Antioch High School in Nashville, in the United States in January 2025, when a 17-year-old student opened fire with a semi-automatic pistol, killing one female student and injuring another.  The perpetrator took his own life at the scene. Immediately before the attack, the perpetrator posted an audio recording online in which he openly stated that he was carrying out this mass murder on behalf of a group affiliated with «764.»

On June 26, according to media reports, a 17-year-old teenager was detained in Russia for creating an online community to recruit other teenagers and organize extremist actions, crimes, and terrorist acts in Russia, the United States, Germany, and Italy. According to the detainee’s testimony, in January 2026, one of the group’s members carried out five arson attacks in Fort Worth, Texas, U.S. Later, in the same state of Texas, the terrorists managed to trigger the evacuation of at least 14 schools by making a false bomb threat. In February 2026, the criminals carried out two arson attacks and triggered one evacuation of educational institutions—this time in the state of California—and in March, they carried out arson attacks in Germany and Italy. The suspect also stated that within the community he had created, there was active propaganda promoting the «Columbine» movement—a group recognized as extremist in Russia and therefore banned—whose members carry out attacks on schools around the world.

According to his own account, the detainee trained the recruited teenagers in tactics for carrying out terrorist attacks and mass killings, provided them with tools of terror, instructions for making homemade explosive devices, and guidance on maintaining secrecy. In Russia, members of the community were planning a series of attacks on educational institutions in various cities.

This is just one person who managed several communities. As for how many such communities there are in total and what their audience reach is, we can only speculate—and, unfortunately, there is no cause for optimism in these speculations.

In short, the conclusions are as follows:

1. The network of extremist communities targeting children and adolescents is actively expanding;

2. Their ideology is becoming increasingly aggressive;

3. The geographic scope of their presence and activity is expanding;

4. The level of public danger posed by their actions is rising;

5. A structured system (training, supply, leadership) is emerging;

6. Educational institutions are their primary targets.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that criminals are actively exploiting the ideology of the «Columbine» movement (cult). These are not merely attacks on schools and other educational institutions; they involve the commission of mass murder as a form of suicide for the perpetrator or group of perpetrators. And such crimes are the most dangerous, because those who commit them have no moral barriers or other restraining factors; they do not consider the consequences of their actions. This is because they know in advance (or think they know) what will happen to them in the end.

The opportunity to gain control of the situation—when it could still have been stopped at a certain point—has already been missed. As is, unfortunately, very often the case, the threat was underestimated, and the necessary countermeasures were not taken at a time when it was still vulnerable. It is now too late—and, from a practical standpoint, pointless—to look for someone to blame. All efforts must be focused on a strategy to counter this threat. We must shift our focus from the question «Who is to blame?» to finding an answer to another, more important question: «What should be done?»

I will outline my proposals for countering this threat in the second part of the article, which I will publish shortly.

 Dear Colleagues,

I would very much welcome your input and suggestions on this topic. As you can see for yourselves, the threat is more than real; it is escalating, and doing so very rapidly. We are faced with a complex applied criminological challenge, but despite its complexity, it is solvable. I invite anyone interested in this area to share their suggestions for possible countermeasures.

The plan is as follows:

1. Containment

Effective measures capable of stopping or significantly slowing the spread of the threat. In our approach, we’ll start from an international perspective; containing the threat within a single country or even a single continent is no longer feasible. Therefore, we consider the following scenario: the organizer is in one country, the recruiter in another, the handler in a third, and the final perpetrators in a fourth.

2. Prevention

Here, the main task is to develop effective practical solutions whose implementation will hinder the spread of information and recruitment, thereby reducing the influx of new members into extremist communities.

3. Disrupting the Management and Coordination System

The objective is clear from the title: we need effective measures that, when implemented, will significantly complicate the work of handlers and organizers in coordinating and managing the activities of operatives, as well as in supplying, training, and monitoring them. I understand that there is little precise data available in open sources regarding the specifics of their organizational structure and operations, but there are general, fundamental principles upon which any modern international criminal organization is built. I do not believe they have invented anything fundamentally new, so we will work from the basic principles found in criminology textbooks.     

4. Prevention and Suppression of Perpetrators’ Actions

Effective practical solutions are needed that will enable the early detection of perpetrators’ preparations for committing crimes and other offenses. We must suppress criminal acts that have progressed to the stage of direct execution. Create conditions that make it difficult for perpetrators to prepare and carry out their criminal plans.

You can develop your proposals however you like—by individual topic or across all four at once, individually or collaboratively. You have complete creative freedom in terms of execution, with the standard restrictions: no politics, mysticism, or conspiracy theories.

You can ask questions here in the comments, via the Portal’s email: mail@orderandsafety.org , or by any other convenient means; all my contact information is available on my Portal page. Please also submit your finished articles there for consideration for publication.  

Author: Roman Grishin

Photo from the website: nevs.ru

#schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #K-12 #massshooting #764 #reddolphin #bluewhale #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #article #threat