Online Extremist Communities and Mass Killings at Schools and Other Educational Institutions. Continued, Part 2.

 

As I mentioned in the first part of this article, the threat posed by online extremist communities is serious and real—there is no longer any doubt about that. I would like to add that in the last month alone, law enforcement agencies have suggested that these communities may have been involved in three more attacks:

June 22, 2026, Tacloban, Philippines;

July 6, 2026, Banting, Malaysia;

July 8, 2026, Schongau, Germany.

Politicians and officials have now acknowledged the very existence of this threat and are demanding that police forces take urgent countermeasures. However, there is no longer a quick and effective solution to this problem. Such an opportunity existed several years ago, when these groups began shifting their ideology, moving from extortion and fraud to organizing mass killings and riots. However, the threat was underestimated at the time, and now the opportunity has been missed.

Under the current circumstances, a completely different approach is needed—not an illusory plan designed for a quick «wow effect», but a strategy, a system designed not only to contain the threat in its current form but also to address the directions and forms of its possible development.

To build such a countermeasure system, I propose using the «Hostile Environment» model. What is this? Imagine crime not as a social phenomenon, but as a living organism. This organism actively grows, develops, and reproduces only if the environment is favorable. In such an environment, there are comfortable weather conditions, sufficient water and food, and no (or minimal) threats in the form of predators or natural disasters. In this case, the population of this species will grow and expand into more and more new territories.

The conclusion is simple: since crime is on the rise, it means the environment is favorable for it, and it is thriving. What should be done? We must develop a counterstrategy designed to make the environment for crime no longer comfortable, but rather hostile and aggressive—one in which the chances of survival are very slim.

 

Step 1: Gathering Information.

This is always the place to start; it is important to understand who you are dealing with, what their goals are, how they operate, and what capabilities they possess. Having as much reliable and objective information as possible about the adversary is half the battle. Their logic becomes clear and their actions become understandable, which means they become predictable—their next moves can be anticipated and thwarted.

The starting point is the testimony provided by surviving suspects in crimes committed in the interests of and at the behest of online extremist communities. They are direct participants who went through the entire chain of events, from recruitment to carrying out the final mission. They know a great deal; the question is, will they be willing to share this information? It is important to understand that, after consulting with their lawyers and parents, they will try to portray themselves as victims who acted unintentionally, under duress, or under threat of physical harm or the public disclosure of compromising material. Only 30–40% of the information in such accounts, which they provided during the investigation, will be reliable. All of them have been punished—some with actual prison terms, others, due to their age, with suspended sentences and restrictive measures. I believe it is acceptable, once the court decisions have taken effect, to offer them the opportunity to testify again, provided that the terms of their punishment are mitigated (within reasonable limits) and their anonymity is guaranteed. This would take place without procedural status, with the involvement of experts in psychology and forensic psychiatry.

The second, equally important area—which should proceed in parallel with the first—is the search for would-be perpetrators who did not carry out the crimes. Those who were also recruited and trained but did not go through with the crime, those who refused at the last moment, and those who were stopped during the preparation stage. This should be done anonymously, also without procedural status, with the involvement of specialists.

It is important to understand exactly how, where, and based on what criteria criminals find their victims—the principle behind selecting targets for potential recruitment. How did they come into contact with the handler of the extremist network? Did they seek out the meeting themselves, or did the recruiters approach them? Next, we need information on how potential victims are subjected to psychological manipulation. The details here are crucial; I am certain that recruiters do not immediately reveal to those they are recruiting their affiliation with extremist organizations and movements, nor do they disclose their objectives regarding these teenagers. This is the main question for the experts. I don’t think that on the other side, each teenager is assigned a professional psychologist or a recruiter with practical experience in foreign intelligence. They likely use people who have undergone some training, but only at the level of crash courses. They operate according to a specific template similar to aggressive online sales tactics; online scammers also use similar tactics.

Based on the limited information that has become publicly available, the recruitment system used by extremist communities closely resembles the one used by ISIS recruiters.

Hypothesis: Based on an analysis of the available information, they operate in a targeted and deliberate manner, using pre-compiled lists of potential victims—teenagers who are in a state of emotional and psychological vulnerability and are easily influenced and manipulated. They obtain these lists through legal and semi-legal means, ordering them through front companies from information and analytics agencies that collect data on target audiences for companies selling goods and services on social media. In this case, they may disguise their actual interest in the specified target audience as a search for potential customers for personal development courses, psychological services, dating sites, merchandise for informal communities, and so on. But in the near future (or perhaps even now), this will no longer be necessary, as specialized  AI-based search programs will be able to collect and perform the initial processing of such data.

The third area involves working with digital traces and analyzing the content of deleted groups, channels, websites, and other online communities. When courts or authorized regulatory bodies (which vary by country) block harmful communities, their content often simply disappears, resulting in the loss of valuable information for analysis. An operational protocol is needed for telecommunications operators and hosting providers, stipulating that, prior to blocking, all metadata (posts, comments, hashtags, timestamps, participants, etc.) must be preserved and transferred to a specialized law enforcement unit (more on this later) for subsequent analysis. This is like a «digital autopsy» for experts; it can yield a great deal of useful information, both for operational intelligence and as evidence in legal proceedings.

It is necessary to gather as much information as possible on the scenarios used by extremists, including details and a detailed algorithm of actions for locating, approaching, and manipulating victims. All of this should be provided to specialists—criminologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists—for analysis. Based on their conclusions, it will be possible to understand:

- the principles of locating and selecting victims;

- the sources of information used and the methods of gathering it;

- the scenarios and templates used in manipulating victims;

- methods of moral and psychological pressure;

- means of communication and other tools for controlling victims.

Expected outcome of this phase:

Using the collected data, it will be possible to develop a statistical model of a potential victim: age, gender, family characteristics (two-parent family or single-parent household, social status, income level, religious affiliation, parenting principles, and parental involvement in the child’s life, etc.), level of intellectual and physical development, attitudes toward school, politics, religion, sports, culture, hobbies, a moral and psychological profile, and other additional information.

The resulting model will make it possible to identify and provide a clear description of the most vulnerable groups of adolescents. This information must be forwarded to schools, colleges, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of children gather. It is intended for practical use by teachers, psychologists, social workers, and staff of relevant police units.

Identifying a well-founded «risk group» of potential victims, placing them under observation, and notifying their parents (or guardians) of the potential threat is the first and most effective preventive measure, which will significantly reduce the effectiveness of extremist recruiters. It will serve as an effective deterrent and significantly slow the spread of the threat.

Key Features of Organizing This Phase:

To ensure the most effective and comprehensive collection of information, this process must be organized on an international scale.

An international information and analysis group is needed, comprising expert analysts and specialists from various countries—primarily those that have already suffered from the actions of criminals in online «death groups»*.

If each country collects information separately, without combining it with data from others, an effective statistical model will not be possible. All analysis will be based on very sparse and incomplete data. As a result, instead of an effective tool for deterring the threat, we will end up with a general template containing vague wording and generic phrases, which is of little practical use. To be frank, this is exactly what we have today. Let me remind you: we are dealing with an international threat that operates according to this pattern: the organizer is in one country, the recruiter in another, the handler in a third, and the final perpetrators in a fourth. Trying to counter them on an «every man for himself» basis won’t work—we’ll lose, yet again. The more information we can gather and process, the more accurate and detailed the experts’ conclusions will be.   Therefore, we must act together; only this will guarantee a positive outcome.

On a personal note: I want to appeal once again to my colleagues—it’s time to put an end to political squabbles and return to being professionals. When it comes to children’s safety, there is no room for disagreements over contrived issues. As you can see, criminals do not distinguish between «good» and «bad» children; they maim and kill everyone, regardless of citizenship, race, religion, or political affiliation.

In my next article, I will continue to share my proposals on countering the activities of «death groups»*. This will be Phase 2, which is dedicated to developing effective practical solutions whose implementation will make it more difficult to spread information and recruit new members, thereby reducing the influx of new operatives into extremist communities.

* This term was coined by journalists who have written about extremist and destructive online communities. I will use this term here and in the future to refer to communities on social media and messaging apps that promote violence and encourage teenagers to commit suicide, mass murder, and other serious crimes.

Author – Roman Grishin.

#schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #K-12 #massshooting #764 #reddolphin #bluewhale #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #article #threat

Safety in Schools and Other Educational Institutions: An Overview of the Current Global Situation, First Half of 2026.

 
The first half of 2026 has come to a close, so it’s time to take stock and draw some preliminary conclusions. The first conclusion is that my forecast, made based on the results of 2025 and published in an article, did not come true. At that time, I predicted that in 2026 there would be a 25–30% decrease in the number of crimes committed, based on key indicators. I reached this conclusion by comparing the sharp spike in crime rates in 2025 with a similar spike in 2014, after which the figures for the following several years were even slightly below average. Based on this comparison, I concluded that in 2014 and 2025, there was a sort of «release of accumulated excess pressure», followed by several years of relative «calm» and then another rise to a new record high. The forecast did not materialize.

The situation in the first half of 2026 became much more complicated, with growth across virtually all indicators.

 

Statistics for the first 6 months, a brief overview:

In total, 72 serious and particularly serious crimes were committed in schools and other educational institutions, which is 35.8% more than during the same period last year (hereinafter referred to as «s.p.l.y.») - 53.

There were 43 crimes involving mass murder and acts of terrorism; during the same period last year, there were 22 such crimes, representing an increase of nearly double, or 95.4%. Below are the specific figures for this category of crimes.

The proportion of crimes committed with firearms decreased slightly to 41.8% (s.p.l.y. - 45.5%), however, the proportion of crimes committed using chemical poisons rose significantly to 11.6% (s.p.l.y. - 4.5%), incendiary devices and mixtures to 9.3% (s.p.l.y. - 4.5%), and explosive devices 4.6% (s.p.l.y. - 0%). The proportion of attacks committed by groups rose slightly to 9.3% (s.p.l.y. - 9.1%), as did that of terrorist attacks 2.3%( s.p.l.y. - 0%).

The percentage of crimes in which vehicles were used as weapons decreased significantly to 0% (s.p.l.y. - 9.1%), and the percentage of crimes in which the perpetrators managed to flee the scene was halved to 18.6% (s.p.l.y. - 36.3%).

Total number of victims (under Section 2, «Crimes with characteristics of mass murders and terrorist acts2): 218 (s.p.l.y. - 143), of whom:

- 46 were killed (s.p.l.y. - 39);

- 172 were injured (s.p.l.y. - 104).

Despite the increase in these figures, the public danger coefficient for attacks in the first half of 2026 decreased to 3.06; in the same period of 2025, it was 4.1.

 

Geography of Crime:

There have been sharp, negative changes in two countries: Turkey and the Philippines.

In Turkey, the situation deteriorated sharply in the spring. The first attack took place on March 2 at a school in Istanbul; a month and a half later, two attacks occurred one day apart: on April 14 in Siverek and the following day in Kahramanmaraş, resulting in 38 victims—10 dead and 28 wounded. In terms of scale, these crimes exceeded the figures for the previous 25 years. Prior to this, mass killings at educational institutions in Turkey had occurred twice: 

- November 22, 2005, in Nusaybin: an attack on a school, 5 victims (1 killed, 4 injured);

- April 5, 2018, in Ankara: an attack on a university, 7 victims (4 killed, 3 injured).

 

In the Philippines, events in June sent shockwaves through the country, with three consecutive attacks occurring within one week:

- June 16, 2026, General Trias, Philippines;

- June 19, 2026, Cavite, Philippines (stabbing, 1 injured, male, 18 years old, student);

- June 22, 2026, Tacloban, Philippines;

Two of the incidents showed signs of mass killings. There were 16 victims, including 3 fatalities and 13 injured.

Prior to this, over the past 25 years, there had been only one similar incident in the Philippines, on October 22, 2010, in Zamboanga; however, that was a single external attack on an elementary school carried out by a perpetrator over 50 years old. In 2026, the picture is completely different: one attack was carried out by a group, two were internal (carried out by students at these schools), and one was of a mixed nature; the oldest of the attackers was 18 years old.

It is still difficult to say exactly what caused such drastic changes in the situation, specifically in these two countries, where, until 2026, such crimes were the exception rather than the rule. There are several theories, but none of them is backed by direct evidence; for now, everything remains at the level of speculation, and more definitive conclusions can be drawn at the end of the year.

As for positive developments, the situation in China shows a positive trend. I’m not sure exactly what this is due to, but for the first half of 2026, there is not a single mention of China in open sources in the context of serious and particularly serious crimes committed in educational institutions. This is unusual, as China typically ranks among the top three countries in terms of the number of such attacks. By comparison, last year saw four crimes in China that met the criteria for mass murders and terrorist acts, two of which occurred in the first half of the year.

Otherwise, no other significant changes were recorded on the world map during the first half of 2026. However, the overall trend is that the list of countries where such crimes are committed is growing every year. As of today, based on statistics for the past six months, the geographic distribution of attacks on educational facilities is as follows: the United States, Russia, Turkey, the Philippines, Brazil, Mexico, Chile, Argentina, South Africa, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Azerbaijan, the United Kingdom, Canada, Thailand, India, the Netherlands, Finland, Uganda, and Lithuania.

I won’t make any predictions for the end of the year, but so far everything indicates that the all-time high set in 2025 will most likely be surpassed this year.

Over the next one and a half to two months, we can expect a lull, as most educational institutions around the world close for summer break. It’s still hard to say what will happen in the fall, when the school year begins. There is a high probability that an already difficult situation could become even more complicated due to the growing activity of online extremist communities and movements, which have shifted to more aggressive tactics and ideologies and have begun actively promoting ideas of misanthropy - but that is a topic for a separate discussion. 

Author – Roman Grishin.

#2026 #statistics #overview #schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #massshooting #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #k-12 #threat

Online Extremist Communities and Mass Killings at Schools and Other Educational Institutions. Continued, Part 1.

 

Note: it should be borne in mind that the author lives and works in Russia, so in this article, he considers the situation on the example of his country. Measures to ensure the safety of schools, other educational institutions and places with a mass stay of children that he proposes are developed by him for use in Russia, taking into account the existing law enforcement system and the situation there.

In 2024, while researching cases of mass school shootings, I first came across information indicating that several such crimes had been committed by teenagers who were carrying out a «final task» assigned by the administrators of a closed social media group. This information was indirectly corroborated by statements from the Children’s Rights Ombudsman, the Chair of the «Safe Internet League» - the largest quasi-governmental organization in the field of digital security—as well as a major public organization providing assistance to minors in crisis situations. It was then that the name of this community - «Red Dolphin» - was first mentioned.

The emergence of communities and movements with similar ideologies and tactics was predictable. First, around 2015, a community called «Blue Whale» emerged, which, operating through social media and messaging apps, incited teenagers to commit suicide. In their activities, they employed a step-by-step scheme to lead the victim toward a planned outcome through the sequential completion of individual tasks modeled after a game-like quest. Even within the community itself, completing these tasks was referred to as «The Game,» with the victim’s profile featuring the hashtag #TheGame and similar tags. Each new «player» was assigned a mentor who gave tasks, monitored their completion, and provided psychological support to the victim until the final task—suicide, most often a jump from a height. There is no exact information in open sources regarding the number of victims officially confirmed. The figures cited in journalistic investigations are contradictory; some sources mention dozens of victims, while others cite hundreds. Regarding the organizers, there is information about only one criminal case—involving the organizer of such a social media community—which was investigated, concluded, sent to court, and resulted in a guilty verdict in 2025.  I am unaware of the motives, but the tactics used by «Blue Whale» were based on an individualized approach aimed at causing the death of a single, isolated person through their own actions.

As for «The Red Dolphin,» things were different here; the tactic was similar—based on the victim, who was being manipulated, carrying out the handler’s instructions—but the tasks here were entirely different. The initial tasks involved minor offenses, such as leaving graffiti on walls and doors or placing a sticker on a car or public transportation. Subsequent tasks became more complex and were classified as criminal offenses, including shoplifting, property damage, assaulting peers or younger children, arson, animal cruelty, and so on. The teenagers were not only required to commit these acts but also to document them with photos and videos and send them to the handler. In effect, they were collecting and handing over incriminating evidence against themselves to the «Game’s» handler. If a teenager tried to refuse to proceed and complete the tasks, blackmail, threats of violence from other «players,» and other forms of psychological pressure would begin. The «handlers» goal was the same—to drive the teenager to suicide—but through a different, more dangerous method. The teenager was first required to commit a mass murder and then take their own life.

This represents a new form of mass murder in educational institutions, with the planning and execution remotely controlled by third parties. Similar crimes have occurred before, but they were primarily mass murders committed in public places or targeting specific individuals or organizations. Recruiters for the terrorist organization ISIS often used this tactic of lone-wolf attacks: they would first identify people interested in their ideology on social media and messaging apps, then remotely indoctrinate them, turning them into committed fanatics. After the subject underwent psychological conditioning, they would receive a command from their handler to take a weapon—or an object used as a weapon—and go out onto the streets to kill people. There have been quite a few such cases, but the use of teenagers to attack schools and other children’s institutions has been virtually nonexistent. There have been terrorist attacks on educational institutions, but they followed a different scenario, and in most cases, the perpetrators were people over the age of 18.

However, I would surmise that the use of teenagers in particular—as the segment of society most susceptible to indoctrination and, at the same time, sufficiently aggressive and reckless—has piqued the interest of terrorist organizations and other extremist groups and movements. Their groups and organizations can be used to instigate mass unrest, while lone actors can be used to carry out mass killings in educational institutions. I first expressed these assumptions in March 2023, when I commented on the situation involving the «Ryodan PMC,» and then in October 2024, I published two more articles (Part 1 and Part 2) on this topic with additional arguments regarding the extremist group «Red Dolphin.»

Even then, I expressed the view that these were not isolated incidents and that we were dealing with a new tactic involving mass killings and the infliction of serious harm on the health of children and adolescents in schools and other educational institutions. I also stated there that, given the development of social media, messaging apps, and other forms of communication, this threat would quickly reach the international level. It appears that this is exactly what has happened.

In early June 2026, my colleagues from the U.S. sent me a link to a document—an open letter from the Dallas, Texas, field office of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to parents, guardians, and teachers. I won’t quote it in full here (those interested can read it for themselves by following the link), but the letter addresses the growing security threat posed by a malicious online network known as «764.» Their members often befriend minors on popular online gaming platforms and social media, gain their trust by posing as friends, and then coerce them into harming themselves or others. They operate worldwide, driven by hatred, sexual gratification, or a desire to sow chaos. Regardless of their motivation, they share a common goal: children and other vulnerable individuals. They exploit the trust they initially gained to manipulate their victims and force them to harm themselves or others. The FBI is currently investigating more than 450 individuals linked to these cruel online networks. The report also provides recommendations on how to monitor teenagers’ behavior and identify direct and indirect signs that a child may have become a victim of such manipulators. It includes links to additional educational resources and contact information for reporting incidents. The bureau reaffirms its commitment to combating this dangerous phenomenon. 

In short, the extremist online community «764» and several other groups associated with it operate primarily within the United States, but have large cells in Greece, the United Kingdom, France, Romania, Brazil, Sweden, Canada, Australia, Spain, and Turkey. Their main activities include sexual blackmail, the distribution of child pornography, and the recruitment of children to commit crimes. The pattern is similar: recruitment, indoctrination, and the commission of crimes under the supervision of handlers—either at the initiative of teenagers who share extremist views or under coercion.

Among the high-profile crimes committed in recent years by supporters of «764,» the following can be cited:

January 2025, Borås, Sweden: A 14-year-old criminal armed with a knife brutally stabbed an elderly woman to death. The attacker recorded the attack on video and personally uploaded the clip online via an account directly linked to and verified by the «764» community in order to report to the moderators;

August 2024, Eskişehir, Turkey: An 18-year-old criminal armed with a knife attacked random passersby near a local mosque; five people were injured. Before the attack, the assailant published his manifesto, to which he attached extremist manuals and Nazi literature actively circulated by «764» supporters;

April 2022, Mediaș, Romania: A 17-year-old assailant armed with a knife attacked an elderly woman, injuring her, and livestreamed the crime online. During the investigation, it was established that the perpetrator carried out this attack as an «initiation rite» to join the «764» group.

Some journalists also attribute to «764» the mass murder in Southport, United Kingdom, in July 2024, when a 17-year-old assailant armed with a knife attacked a children’s dance studio, killing 3 people and injuring 10 others. Despite the suspect’s interest in extremist ideology, his connection to «764» or similar groups has not been definitively established or confirmed.

Among the attacks carried out by «764» adherents on educational institutions, a link has been confirmed to the attack on Antioch High School in Nashville, in the United States in January 2025, when a 17-year-old student opened fire with a semi-automatic pistol, killing one female student and injuring another.  The perpetrator took his own life at the scene. Immediately before the attack, the perpetrator posted an audio recording online in which he openly stated that he was carrying out this mass murder on behalf of a group affiliated with «764.»

On June 26, according to media reports, a 17-year-old teenager was detained in Russia for creating an online community to recruit other teenagers and organize extremist actions, crimes, and terrorist acts in Russia, the United States, Germany, and Italy. According to the detainee’s testimony, in January 2026, one of the group’s members carried out five arson attacks in Fort Worth, Texas, U.S. Later, in the same state of Texas, the terrorists managed to trigger the evacuation of at least 14 schools by making a false bomb threat. In February 2026, the criminals carried out two arson attacks and triggered one evacuation of educational institutions—this time in the state of California—and in March, they carried out arson attacks in Germany and Italy. The suspect also stated that within the community he had created, there was active propaganda promoting the «Columbine» movement—a group recognized as extremist in Russia and therefore banned—whose members carry out attacks on schools around the world.

According to his own account, the detainee trained the recruited teenagers in tactics for carrying out terrorist attacks and mass killings, provided them with tools of terror, instructions for making homemade explosive devices, and guidance on maintaining secrecy. In Russia, members of the community were planning a series of attacks on educational institutions in various cities.

This is just one person who managed several communities. As for how many such communities there are in total and what their audience reach is, we can only speculate—and, unfortunately, there is no cause for optimism in these speculations.

In short, the conclusions are as follows:

1. The network of extremist communities targeting children and adolescents is actively expanding;

2. Their ideology is becoming increasingly aggressive;

3. The geographic scope of their presence and activity is expanding;

4. The level of public danger posed by their actions is rising;

5. A structured system (training, supply, leadership) is emerging;

6. Educational institutions are their primary targets.

The situation is further complicated by the fact that criminals are actively exploiting the ideology of the «Columbine» movement (cult). These are not merely attacks on schools and other educational institutions; they involve the commission of mass murder as a form of suicide for the perpetrator or group of perpetrators. And such crimes are the most dangerous, because those who commit them have no moral barriers or other restraining factors; they do not consider the consequences of their actions. This is because they know in advance (or think they know) what will happen to them in the end.

The opportunity to gain control of the situation—when it could still have been stopped at a certain point—has already been missed. As is, unfortunately, very often the case, the threat was underestimated, and the necessary countermeasures were not taken at a time when it was still vulnerable. It is now too late—and, from a practical standpoint, pointless—to look for someone to blame. All efforts must be focused on a strategy to counter this threat. We must shift our focus from the question «Who is to blame?» to finding an answer to another, more important question: «What should be done?»

I will outline my proposals for countering this threat in the second part of the article, which I will publish shortly.

 Dear Colleagues,

I would very much welcome your input and suggestions on this topic. As you can see for yourselves, the threat is more than real; it is escalating, and doing so very rapidly. We are faced with a complex applied criminological challenge, but despite its complexity, it is solvable. I invite anyone interested in this area to share their suggestions for possible countermeasures.

The plan is as follows:

1. Containment

Effective measures capable of stopping or significantly slowing the spread of the threat. In our approach, we’ll start from an international perspective; containing the threat within a single country or even a single continent is no longer feasible. Therefore, we consider the following scenario: the organizer is in one country, the recruiter in another, the handler in a third, and the final perpetrators in a fourth.

2. Prevention

Here, the main task is to develop effective practical solutions whose implementation will hinder the spread of information and recruitment, thereby reducing the influx of new members into extremist communities.

3. Disrupting the Management and Coordination System

The objective is clear from the title: we need effective measures that, when implemented, will significantly complicate the work of handlers and organizers in coordinating and managing the activities of operatives, as well as in supplying, training, and monitoring them. I understand that there is little precise data available in open sources regarding the specifics of their organizational structure and operations, but there are general, fundamental principles upon which any modern international criminal organization is built. I do not believe they have invented anything fundamentally new, so we will work from the basic principles found in criminology textbooks.     

4. Prevention and Suppression of Perpetrators’ Actions

Effective practical solutions are needed that will enable the early detection of perpetrators’ preparations for committing crimes and other offenses. We must suppress criminal acts that have progressed to the stage of direct execution. Create conditions that make it difficult for perpetrators to prepare and carry out their criminal plans.

You can develop your proposals however you like—by individual topic or across all four at once, individually or collaboratively. You have complete creative freedom in terms of execution, with the standard restrictions: no politics, mysticism, or conspiracy theories.

You can ask questions here in the comments, via the Portal’s email: mail@orderandsafety.org , or by any other convenient means; all my contact information is available on my Portal page. Please also submit your finished articles there for consideration for publication.  

Author: Roman Grishin

Photo from the website: nevs.ru

#schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #K-12 #massshooting #764 #reddolphin #bluewhale #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #article #threat

A new article titled “Ensuring Safety in Educational Institutions.”

 

 I worked on it for four long years, during which time I gathered materials and prepared and published two additional studies on a similar topic.

The work took so long because I was looking for more than just practical solutions to existing safety issues in schools and other educational institutions. The main objective was to build a system out of them—a unified mechanism where everything is interconnected, where there are no superfluous details, and  each element complements and reinforces the others, where technology enhances and expands human capabilities rather than replacing them. 

The primary condition for working on the system project presented in this article—designed to ensure comprehensive security for educational facilities against criminal, terrorist, and other threats—was that a school must remain a school, not turn into a prison or a military base. It was difficult, but I managed to find such solutions.

The article begins with an analysis of the current situation, the results of conducted research, and an assessment of existing and potential threats. Subsequently, based on effective global practices for preventing and countering such threats, as well as public demand, I outlined my practical solutions, each of which is aimed at addressing specific vulnerabilities in the existing system for organizing security and safety at educational institutions, as identified during the study of actual crimes.

The project includes: administrative and legal measures, proposals for changes and additions to the system of technical fortification and security of educational institutions, the organization of security, monitoring, and response to direct threats, the use of technical security and access control measures, as well as many other issues and areas. 

In conclusion, I presented the results of a hypothetical experiment on the application of all proposed solutions, using the example of a real attack on an educational facility.

I am fully aware that the framework I propose has not yet been tested in practice, and it is premature to speak of its effectiveness; many of the proposals outlined in it are controversial. However, I believe I have achieved the main goal: to create a format, a basic foundation that can be used as a starting point to work on, improve, make changes and additions to, enhance capabilities, and increase effectiveness. To strive for excellence and create a safe space for our children.

As always, I welcome your reviews, feedback, comments, and constructive criticism. 

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#schoolsafety #schoolsecurity #educationalsecurity #educationalsafety #violenceprevention #K-12 #massshooting #schoolshooting #research #criminology #schoolcrime #educationalcrime #terrorism #schoolterrorism #educationalterrorism #massmurder #article #threat

Announcement: Ensuring Comprehensive Safety in Schools and Other Educational Institutions: From Problem Analysis to Practical Solutions.

 

Note: it should be borne in mind that the author lives and works in Russia, so in this article, he considers the situation on the example of his country. Measures to ensure the safety of schools, other educational institutions and places with a mass stay of children that he proposes are developed by him for use in Russia, taking into account the existing law enforcement system and the situation there.

I am pleased to announce that I have finally completed the main part of my work on the article «Ensuring Comprehensive Safety in Schools, Other Educational Institutions, and Facilities and Locations Frequented by Large Numbers of Children Against Threats of a Criminal, Terrorist, and Other Nature».

All that remains are purely technical details: combining the separate sections into a single whole, making corrections, formatting it, and preparing it for publication on the portal’s main website. There is no exact date yet, but tentatively - late May to early June of this year.

This article is of a practical nature. I am not interested in discussing the problem or stirring up the atmosphere around it—crime statistics in schools, kindergartens, colleges, and universities do that much better. I am also not interested in the motives of criminals. I do not believe, nor do I even entertain the thought, that the mass murder of innocent people could have any justification whatsoever.

My interest lies in finding answers to other questions: can this be stopped? And if so, how exactly can it be done?

I began searching for answers to these questions back in 2018, when I was working on my first article about safety in schools and other educational institutions. I started that work almost immediately after the tragedy at the Kerch Polytechnic College, where 20 people were killed and another 67 were injured.

At the time, as I studied the timeline of that tragedy, I tried to understand: why was it so easy for the perpetrator to commit such a monstrous crime?

Here’s what I saw. A man armed with a gun, a large amount of ammunition, and homemade explosive devices leaves his home, walks to a public transportation stop, gets on a bus, rides to the right stop, walks to the college building, goes inside, finds an open, isolated room, prepares his weapon, arranges the ammunition for quick reloading, and sets the timers on the bombs. Then he goes out, heads to the emergency exit, tries to block it, walks toward the cafeteria, sets up an explosive device, goes back, grabs his weapon, and starts killing.

An explosion, panic. The killer moves calmly and, most importantly, unhindered through the college hallways, shooting at anyone who crosses his path or comes into view. He throws homemade grenades. Then he goes to the library, where he commits suicide.

It was all over before the first police car even arrived on the scene. No one stopped the criminal. No one stopped him. He killed himself when he considered his bloody mission accomplished. From start to finish, he had the situation completely under control.

 

It would be one thing if this were the first tragedy of its kind in Russia. But before this, there were Beslan, Moscow, Ivanteevka, Perm, Ulan-Ude, Shadrinsk, Sterlitamak, and Barabinsk. Wasn’t that enough to realize that the threat is real, and that a tragedy on the scale of the Kerch College attack is only a matter of time?

However, even this crime did not serve as a catalyst for recognizing the level of the threat and revising the entire security system. As always, everything was limited to talk and formal measures that had no real impact on the situation. Next came Kazan, Perm, Izhevsk, Bryansk—and these are only the largest crimes in terms of the number of victims. There were others, and quite a few of them.

The situation in other countries also clearly shows that there is no basis for optimistic forecasts. Statistics (link) clearly demonstrate a trend toward an increase in the number of similar crimes worldwide. The year 2025 set a kind of anti-record for their number. However, the first five months of 2026 clearly indicate that this record will be broken in the very near future.

All of this clearly demonstrates the complete vulnerability of schools and other educational institutions to criminals and terrorists. Every time there is another attack, meetings and discussions begin, task forces and commissions convene, plans and decisions are formulated, and high-profile statements are made to the media. However, very little time passes before new attacks occur and new victims emerge.

At the same time, even the simplest analysis of the chronology of these events shows that in most cases, the criminals exploited the same vulnerabilities that have long been known to everyone.

I was unable to get started right away. Difficulties arose, forcing me to postpone the work for nearly two years.

In the first area of research (the security situation at educational institutions in Russia and around the world), I encountered a lack of statistical data on crimes in this category that had been collected and systematized in a single source. I had to spend a tremendous amount of time and effort gathering information from dozens of different sources and cross-checking it.

Without these statistics, it is impossible to:

- gain an objective picture of what is happening;

- conduct a thorough (comparative and cross-sectional) analysis of the data;

- track developments over time;

- assess the true scale of the threat;

- explain ongoing criminological processes and identify the factors influencing them;

- predict how events will unfold.

Furthermore, there is a lack of understanding regarding the direction and specific characteristics of the threat’s development, which makes it extremely difficult to devise effective countermeasures. We see the result now, when, following yet another mass shooting or terrorist attack at an educational institution, experts, political analysts, law enforcement officials, educators, and journalists ask themselves: «Why didn’t the measures developed and implemented as part of the security strategy work?»

The answer is simple: they were developed based on incomplete data. And in many cases, this data was not only incomplete but also unreliable.

I myself have often come across statistics in media reports that are far removed from reality. For example, when commenting on yet another mass shooting at a school or university, the author would back up the article with general statistics on incidents at educational institutions—even though most of these incidents were not even indirectly related to mass shootings or terrorism. For the most part, these are general criminal offenses: committed due to personal animosity, or for financial gain (robberies, muggings, extortion), often out of hooliganism or even unintentionally.

Therefore, it is extremely important not only to know the statistics, but also to understand what lies behind these numbers. Proper data categorization is equally important.

The principles I used during data collection:

All collected cases underwent cross-analysis and comparison of information from various sources.

Preference was given to police press releases, reports, and court transcripts—these contain more facts than speculation.

All incidents were divided into groups and subgroups based on various criminological characteristics. This classification allows us to clearly see the nature of the situation’s development over a specific time period, both in comparison and in terms of trends.

Based on high-quality, systematically organized statistical data, it is possible to create more accurate (than currently available) criminological models and forecasts. Most importantly, these models can be used to develop truly effective measures for preventing and combating threats.

This requires reliable source data—verified, organized, and compiled into a single repository. But such data did not exist.

It became clear that a unified information and reference resource was needed, containing information on crimes in this category and at least a brief (minimal) set of factual data about their perpetrators and circumstances. Realizing this, I set out to create it.

As a format for presenting the data, I chose a format similar to a police incident report: a brief summary of the circumstances containing such information as the date, time, place, method, object, perpetrator, victims, consequences, outcome, and other reliably established facts.

In February 2024, the first edition of the Handbook of Crimes and Terrorist Acts in Schools and Other Educational Institutions was published on the «Public Order and Safety» portal, containing statistical data spanning 24 years (from 2000 through 2023).

The information has since been updated and expanded. The fifth edition is now available for download, containing data spanning 26 years. One of the main objectives has been achieved: an informative, user-friendly, and, most importantly, publicly accessible reference and analytical tool has been created for researchers and specialists in school safety.

For me, the main outcome of working on the handbook was that I was finally able to see a fairly objective picture regarding the first area of research. And as it turned out, this picture is far from optimistic. I won’t delve too deeply into the details—you can review the statistics and analytics for yourselves. The most important thing is that the year and a half spent on this was not wasted.

While studying materials on crimes in educational institutions, I noticed that experts often use the term «safety level» in their assessments, adding various adjectives to it: high, low, satisfactory, unsatisfactory, adequate, minimal, and so on. This raised a question for me: what exactly do they mean by this concept, and how do they define it?

After reviewing the information available in open sources, I have concluded that there is currently no unified (or even widely used) system in our country for assessing the safety levels of educational institutions based on formal criteria. Most reports containing such assessments are based on the personal opinions of the experts who compiled them.

An analysis of international experience also revealed nothing concrete—the situation there appears to be similar.

This situation struck me as, to put it mildly, strange. It is clear that there is a need for such a tool. Although I am not a proponent of total standardization in safety matters, I consider this area an exception. Since there was no evaluation system that could objectively calculate the safety level of an educational facility based on formal criteria (with minimal human influence), and I needed such a tool for my work, I decided to create it myself.

The result is a table in which evaluations are based on 64 criteria covering:

- characteristics of the educational facility’s grounds and its location;

- characteristics of buildings and structures;

- the presence of physical security and its features;

- technical security measures and their capabilities;

- additional active and passive security measures.

Each item, if present and operational, is assigned a number of points, which are then totaled. A final score is calculated. In addition to the total score, there are factors that negatively impact the final score.

Once completed, the table clearly shows:

- the level of security at the educational institution;

- its capabilities;

and most importantly—obvious shortcomings and vulnerabilities in the security system.

Based on the resulting assessment, measures and costs can be planned to improve the facility’s security level. Using annual data on such assessments of one or more facilities, it is easy to conduct comparative and dynamic analyses, clearly assessing the situation in a specific school, city, region, or even country over a given time period. You can compare both overall assessments and individual indicators or sections.

The result is a convenient and, most importantly, objective tool for monitoring the situation, where even a one-point drop in the rating compared to the previous period immediately indicates that the situation is deteriorating and action must be taken.

Even while collecting data for the handbook and developing the assessment table, I increasingly came to the conclusion that the model of a comprehensive security system for educational institutions that I had previously developed and outlined in my first article was ineffective and unpromising.

Solving the problem would require a completely different approach.

I began work on this at the end of 2023. In May 2026, I finally managed to complete it (though I assume it is not yet final).

In my new development, I was guided by public demand, which is as follows: schools, other educational institutions (including preschools), as well as facilities where large numbers of children gather, must be reliably protected from criminal, terrorist, and other threats, but at the same time, they must not be turned into something resembling a prison or a military base.

Is this realistic? I believe it is.

What needs to be done to achieve this, why, and exactly how—I will address these questions in the main article.

The publication is scheduled for late May to early June of this year on the «Public Order and Safety» portal.

Author – Roman Grishin.

Poisoning as a weapon in schools: a new threat scenario

 
On January 21, 2026 *, a seventh-grade student, aged about 14, brought a chemical education kit (such kits are freely available in stores) to school. He selected one of the dangerous and toxic reagents, mixed it into a carbonated drink, and then offered it to his classmates. Three teenagers drank the beverage, felt severely ill, and were hospitalized at the nearest hospital with a diagnosis of toxic poisoning. Thanks to the competent actions of the medical staff, the teenagers' lives were not in danger, and they were discharged from the hospital the next day.

Unfortunately, attempts by schoolchildren to commit mass murders of their classmates or cause harm to their health are not uncommon these days. In this case, what is of interest to experts is not the fact of the crime itself, but the method chosen by the perpetrator. The use of toxic chemicals as weapons in mass killings in educational institutions is not the most common method, but it is not unique either. Since 2000, there have been five** recorded cases of this kind:

November 20, 2006, Emsdetten, Germany
attack on a secondary school, using chemical poisons (smoke grenades) as secondary weapons; 37 victims (0 killed, 37 injured); perpetrator – male, age at the time of the crime – 18, former student of the school;

November 12, 2019, Kaiyuan, China
attack on an elementary school, using chemical poisons (toxic powder), 54 victims (0 killed, 54 injured), perpetrator – male, age at the time of the crime – 23;

December 2, 2024, Berlin, Germany
attack on an elementary school using chemical poisons (tear gas), 44 victims (0 killed, 44 injured), suspect fled, crime unsolved, identity of perpetrator unknown;

February 4, 2025, Erebro, Sweden
attack on a secondary school, using (as an auxiliary weapon) chemical poisons (smoke grenades), 22 victims (10 killed, 12 wounded), perpetrator - male, age at the time of the crime - 35 years old;

December 16, 2025, Odintsovo, Russia
attack on a secondary school, using (as an auxiliary weapon) chemical poisons (tear gas), 4 victims (1 killed, 3 wounded), age at the time of the crime - 15 years old, a student at the school.

As can be seen from the description, the criminals mainly used tear gas or poisonous smoke; in one case, the criminal sprayed toxic powder in the premises. In three out of five cases, the attackers used poisonous substances as additional weapons and only in two cases as the sole weapon.  I have not found any cases of attacks on educational institutions involving the deliberate poisoning of food or drink as a means of committing a crime, although I fully admit that they may have occurred but were not reported to the police or the media.

I would suggest that in this case, we are dealing with a new method of committing crimes such as deliberate mass harm to health or murder. Given the active discussion of this fact in the media, social networks, and forums, there is a high probability that a similar scenario could well be repeated in the near future.

I invite everyone who is involved in or simply interested in the field of applied criminology, such as the security of schools and other educational institutions, to participate in the development of effective, practical methods for preventing and suppressing threats committed in the following manner: deliberate poisoning of food or beverages with dangerous chemicals (or naturally occurring components) with the aim of mass murder or causing harm to human health.

You can contact the author in any convenient way listed on his page.

Author – Roman Grishin.

 

* The crime took place at a lyceum in the village of Kuyuki, Pestrechinsky District, Republic of Tatarstan, Russia.

** There is partially confirmed data on a series of attacks using poisonous substances in schools and higher education institutions in Iran in 2022-2023. Unfortunately, Iran's information secrecy does not allow us to obtain accurate data on the circumstances of the crimes (if they occurred at all) established by law enforcement agencies for analysis and publication in the handbook.

 

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