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As I mentioned
in the first part of this article, the threat posed by online extremist
communities is serious and real—there is no longer any doubt about that. I
would like to add that in the last month alone, law enforcement agencies have
suggested that these communities may have been involved in three more attacks:
June 22, 2026,
Tacloban, Philippines;
July 6, 2026,
Banting, Malaysia;
July 8, 2026,
Schongau, Germany.
Politicians
and officials have now acknowledged the very existence of this threat and are
demanding that police forces take urgent countermeasures. However, there is no
longer a quick and effective solution to this problem. Such an opportunity
existed several years ago, when these groups began shifting their ideology,
moving from extortion and fraud to organizing mass killings and riots. However,
the threat was underestimated at the time, and now the opportunity has been
missed.
Under the
current circumstances, a completely different approach is needed—not an
illusory plan designed for a quick «wow effect», but a strategy, a system
designed not only to contain the threat in its current form but also to address
the directions and forms of its possible development.
To build such
a countermeasure system, I propose using the «Hostile Environment» model. What
is this? Imagine crime not as a social phenomenon, but as a living organism.
This organism actively grows, develops, and reproduces only if the environment
is favorable. In such an environment, there are comfortable weather conditions,
sufficient water and food, and no (or minimal) threats in the form of predators
or natural disasters. In this case, the population of this species will grow
and expand into more and more new territories.
The conclusion
is simple: since crime is on the rise, it means the environment is favorable
for it, and it is thriving. What should be done? We must develop a
counterstrategy designed to make the environment for crime no longer
comfortable, but rather hostile and aggressive—one in which the chances of
survival are very slim.
Step
1: Gathering Information.
This is always
the place to start; it is important to understand who you are dealing with,
what their goals are, how they operate, and what capabilities they possess.
Having as much reliable and objective information as possible about the
adversary is half the battle. Their logic becomes clear and their actions
become understandable, which means they become predictable—their next moves can
be anticipated and thwarted.
The starting
point is the testimony provided by surviving suspects in crimes committed in
the interests of and at the behest of online extremist communities. They are
direct participants who went through the entire chain of events, from
recruitment to carrying out the final mission. They know a great deal; the
question is, will they be willing to share this information? It is important to
understand that, after consulting with their lawyers and parents, they will try
to portray themselves as victims who acted unintentionally, under duress, or
under threat of physical harm or the public disclosure of compromising
material. Only 30–40% of the information in such accounts, which they provided
during the investigation, will be reliable. All of them have been punished—some
with actual prison terms, others, due to their age, with suspended sentences
and restrictive measures. I believe it is acceptable, once the court decisions
have taken effect, to offer them the opportunity to testify again, provided
that the terms of their punishment are mitigated (within reasonable limits) and
their anonymity is guaranteed. This would take place without procedural status,
with the involvement of experts in psychology and forensic psychiatry.
The second,
equally important area—which should proceed in parallel with the first—is the
search for would-be perpetrators who did not carry out the crimes. Those who
were also recruited and trained but did not go through with the crime, those
who refused at the last moment, and those who were stopped during the
preparation stage. This should be done anonymously, also without procedural
status, with the involvement of specialists.
It is
important to understand exactly how, where, and based on what criteria
criminals find their victims—the principle behind selecting targets for
potential recruitment. How did they come into contact with the handler of the
extremist network? Did they seek out the meeting themselves, or did the
recruiters approach them? Next, we need information on how potential victims
are subjected to psychological manipulation. The details here are crucial; I am
certain that recruiters do not immediately reveal to those they are recruiting
their affiliation with extremist organizations and movements, nor do they
disclose their objectives regarding these teenagers. This is the main question
for the experts. I don’t think that on the other side, each teenager is
assigned a professional psychologist or a recruiter with practical experience
in foreign intelligence. They likely use people who have undergone some
training, but only at the level of crash courses. They operate according to a
specific template similar to aggressive online sales tactics; online scammers
also use similar tactics.
Based on the
limited information that has become publicly available, the recruitment system
used by extremist communities closely resembles the one used by ISIS
recruiters.
Hypothesis: Based on an analysis of the
available information, they operate in a targeted and deliberate manner, using
pre-compiled lists of potential victims—teenagers who are in a state of
emotional and psychological vulnerability and are easily influenced and
manipulated. They obtain these lists through legal and semi-legal means,
ordering them through front companies from information and analytics agencies
that collect data on target audiences for companies selling goods and services
on social media. In this case, they may disguise their actual interest in the
specified target audience as a search for potential customers for personal
development courses, psychological services, dating sites, merchandise for
informal communities, and so on. But in the near future (or perhaps even now),
this will no longer be necessary, as specialized AI-based search programs will be able to
collect and perform the initial processing of such data.
The third area
involves working with digital traces and analyzing the content of deleted
groups, channels, websites, and other online communities. When courts or
authorized regulatory bodies (which vary by country) block harmful communities,
their content often simply disappears, resulting in the loss of valuable
information for analysis. An operational protocol is needed for
telecommunications operators and hosting providers, stipulating that, prior to
blocking, all metadata (posts, comments, hashtags, timestamps, participants,
etc.) must be preserved and transferred to a specialized law enforcement unit
(more on this later) for subsequent analysis. This is like a «digital autopsy»
for experts; it can yield a great deal of useful information, both for
operational intelligence and as evidence in legal proceedings.
It is
necessary to gather as much information as possible on the scenarios used by extremists,
including details and a detailed algorithm of actions for locating,
approaching, and manipulating victims. All of this should be provided to
specialists—criminologists, psychologists, and psychiatrists—for analysis.
Based on their conclusions, it will be possible to understand:
- the
principles of locating and selecting victims;
- the sources
of information used and the methods of gathering it;
- the
scenarios and templates used in manipulating victims;
- methods of
moral and psychological pressure;
- means of
communication and other tools for controlling victims.
Expected
outcome of this phase:
Using the
collected data, it will be possible to develop a statistical model of a
potential victim: age, gender, family characteristics (two-parent family or
single-parent household, social status, income level, religious affiliation,
parenting principles, and parental involvement in the child’s life, etc.),
level of intellectual and physical development, attitudes toward school,
politics, religion, sports, culture, hobbies, a moral and psychological
profile, and other additional information.
The resulting
model will make it possible to identify and provide a clear description of the
most vulnerable groups of adolescents. This information must be forwarded to schools,
colleges, other educational institutions, and places where large numbers of
children gather. It is intended for practical use by teachers, psychologists,
social workers, and staff of relevant police units.
Identifying a
well-founded «risk group» of potential victims, placing them under observation,
and notifying their parents (or guardians) of the potential threat is the first
and most effective preventive measure, which will significantly reduce the
effectiveness of extremist recruiters. It will serve as an effective deterrent
and significantly slow the spread of the threat.
Key Features
of Organizing This Phase:
To ensure the
most effective and comprehensive collection of information, this process must
be organized on an international scale.
An international
information and analysis group is needed, comprising expert analysts and
specialists from various countries—primarily those that have already suffered
from the actions of criminals in online «death groups»*.
If each
country collects information separately, without combining it with data from
others, an effective statistical model will not be possible. All analysis will
be based on very sparse and incomplete data. As a result, instead of an
effective tool for deterring the threat, we will end up with a general template
containing vague wording and generic phrases, which is of little practical use.
To be frank, this is exactly what we have today. Let me remind you: we are
dealing with an international threat that operates according to this pattern:
the organizer is in one country, the recruiter in another, the handler in a
third, and the final perpetrators in a fourth. Trying to counter them on an «every
man for himself» basis won’t work—we’ll lose, yet again. The more information
we can gather and process, the more accurate and detailed the experts’
conclusions will be. Therefore, we must
act together; only this will guarantee a positive outcome.
On a personal
note: I want to appeal once again to my colleagues—it’s time
to put an end to political squabbles and return to being professionals. When it
comes to children’s safety, there is no room for disagreements over contrived
issues. As you can see, criminals do not distinguish between «good» and «bad»
children; they maim and kill everyone, regardless of citizenship, race,
religion, or political affiliation.
In my next
article, I will continue to share my proposals on countering the activities of «death
groups»*. This will be Phase 2, which is dedicated to developing
effective practical solutions whose implementation will make it more difficult
to spread information and recruit new members, thereby reducing the influx of
new operatives into extremist communities.
* This term was coined by journalists who have written about extremist and destructive online communities. I will use this term here and in the future to refer to communities on social media and messaging apps that promote violence and encourage teenagers to commit suicide, mass murder, and other serious crimes.
Author – Roman Grishin.
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